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WHY NOW IS THE TIME TO STATUTORILY BAN
INSIDER TRADING UNDER THE EQUALITY OF
ACCESS THEORY
BRUCE W. KLAW*
ABSTRACT
This Article makes the case for a new U.S. statutory provision
that defines and prohibits insider trading under an equality of 
access theory. It supports this claim, and contributes to the 
important public dialogue concerning this prevalent practice, by
highlighting the moral and legal gaps in existing U.S. law that
result from understanding the harms of trading on the basis of
material nonpublic information solely with reference to fiduciary
breach or misappropriation, as evidenced by the recent cases of
UnitedStatesv. Newman and UnitedStatesv. Salman. It weaves
legal analysis together with current literature in business ethics,
moral philosophy, finance, and accounting to consolidate and offer
new arguments in the long-standing debate over insider trading
based on Rawlsian social contract theory, applied deontology, and
empirically informed utilitarianism. It then draws on lessons
learned from empirical analysis of European states adoption of 
the equality of access theory under the Market Abuse Directive.
Finally, it analyzes three insider trading bills currently pending in
Congress and makes the case for a statute, like S. 702, that will
prohibit the use, by anyone, of material information concerning a
financial instrument that is not, at least in principle, available to
others through independent and otherwise lawful due diligence.
* Assistant Professor, Dept of Business Ethics & Legal Studies, Daniels 
College ofBusiness, University ofDenver;J.D., Harvard Law School;B.A.,
Binghamton;Philosophy, Politics& Law.
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INTRODUCTION
Asitturnsout, cheatersdowin. Thiswasthelesson implicitly
taughtbytheUnited StatesSupremeCourtwhen itdeclined to
review theSecond CircuitCourtof Appeals landmark decision in 
United States v. Newman, which effectively legalized in thatCir-
cuitcertain formsofinsidertrading by those who receive non-
publiccorporateinform ation through clandestinetipssolongas
theinsiderfrom whom thetipsoriginateddidnotreceiveasuffi-
ciently valuable personal benefit in exchange for them, or so 
long as the ultimate tippee rem ains plausibly ignorantofwho
theoriginaltipperwasand whathereceived in exchange.1 And
whiletheSupremeCourtnow appearspoised through itsgrant
ofreview in United States v. Salman toeitherexpressly extend
Newman throughoutthe United States, orcurtailitin some re-
spectsbyonceagainbarringtippeesfrom willfullyusingnonpublic
information provided asmere gifts, the underlying dysfunction
ofU.S. insidertradinglaw cannotbecured byjudicialdecisions
alone. Toensurethetransparency and health ofU.S. securities
m arkets, itis tim e to finally enacta dedicated insidertrading
statutethatcomportswith thefundamentaldictatesofethicsby
recognizingtheindependentwrongfulnessoftradingoninformation
thatthetraderknowsorshouldknow cannotbeaccessedbyothers
through theirown lawfulandindependentdiligence.
Although U.S. insidertradinglaw hasbeen troublinglydiscon-
nected from ethicalnorms fordecades, the im plications ofthis
disjunction cametoaheadin Decemberof2014when theSecond
Circuitin Newman vacated the convictions oftwo hedge fund
portfoliomanagerswhoundeniablytradedon thebasisoftipsof
m aterialnonpublicinform ation toreapm orethan $72 million in
profits.2 AccordingtotheU.S. Departm entofJustice, theprece-
dentsetin Newman arguably represents oneofthemostsignif-
icant developm ents in insider trading law in a generation.3
1 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 84 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Oct. 5,
2015)(No. 15-137).
2 UnitedStatesv. Newman, 773 F.3d438, 443 (2dCir. 2014).
3 Plaintiffs Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2223, Newman, 773 F.3d
438 (2014)(No. 13-1837).
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Dismissing the defendants indictments with prejudice, the
Newman courtheld thattherem otehedgefund tippeesin that
casecould notbeliableforinsidertrading, and thatprosecutors
failed toshow thatthecorporateinsidersfrom whom advanced
earnings tips em anated had violated their fiduciary duties to
theircorporate principals by receiving personalbenefits in ex-
change for their tips that were objective, consequential, and 
represent[ed]atleastapotentialgain ofapecuniaryorsim ilarly
valuable nature.4 Thisholding seemingly tightened thepersonal
benefitrequirementpreviouslyannounced in the1983 Supreme
CourtcaseDirks v. SEC, which held thattheintangiblereputa-
tionalbenefitsgainedbygiftingtipsweresufficienttoconstitute
a breach of the insider-tippers fiduciary duty.5 Prosecutors in
Newman also failed to satisfy a new knowledgerequirem entin
theSecond Circuit, which now requiresprosecutorstoshow not
only that the tippee knew or should have known of the tippers 
fiduciarybreach(an inferencethatcouldarguablyarisefrom the
availability ofconfidentialinformation itself), butm ore specifi-
cally that the tippee knew that an insiderdisclosedconfidential
informationand [knew]thathedidsoin exchangeforapersonal
benefit.6 Taken together, theholdingsin theNewman casefur-
thernarrowed thealreadyanem icdefinition ofunlawfultrading
underSection 10(b)andRule10b-5, asinterpretedbyamajority
ofthe Suprem e Courtin Dirks, and they effectively im munize
certainformsofm arketcheatingfrom prosecution.7
Asthe governmenthasrecognized, theprecedentsetby the
Newman case unjustifiably impedes the governm ents ability to 
restrain and punish tippers and tippees engaging in culpable
4 Id. at452.
5 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983) (explaining that the tippees liability depends on 
whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider and that such breach of 
duty depends upon whether the insider receivesadirectorindirectpersonal
benefitfrom thedisclosure, such aspecuniarygain or a reputational benefit that
will translate into future earnings.) (emphasis added); see also VictorBrudney,
Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages under the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 348 (1979) (The theory ... is that the insider, by 
givingtheinformation outselectively, isin effectsellingtheinformation toits
recipient for cash, reciprocal information, or other things of value for himself ....). 
6 Newman, 773 F.3dat442 (emphasisadded).
7 See id. at442, 452.
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behavior.8 It licenses trading by insiders favored tippees, thereby 
shiftinglossestoinvestorswholack accesstoconfidentialcorpo-
rateinform ationanderodingpublicconfidenceintheintegrityof
securities markets.9 It disadvantages legitimate analysts who 
pursue research and modeling based on authorized information.10
It blurs the line between legitim ate and prohibited activity.11
And it increases the chances that such conduct will proliferate.12
Indeed, sinceitsissuance, theNewman precedenthasprompted
thevacaturofnumerousguilty pleasand variouspotentially suc-
cessfulappealsby convicted insidetraders.13 Forthesereasons,
on July 30, 2015, theSolicitorGeneralpetitioned the Suprem e
Courtfor a writ ofcertiorari, seeking to overturn Newman.14
Despite the governments warnings, however, the Supreme Court 
deniedreview withoutcomm enton October5, 2015.15
Perhaps cognizantofthe publicconfusion and outrage over
Newman, theSupremeCourtlessthan fourmonthslatermade
asurprisem oveon January19, 2016 tograntreview ofanother
tipper-tippeeinsidertradingcase, United States v. Salman, which
seeminglycontradictsNewman on thetypeofim properpersonal
benefitnecessary toconstitutea fiduciary breach by an insider
underDirks.16
In United States v. Salman, the Ninth CircuitCourtofAp-
peals affirmed the conviction ofBassam Salm an, who received
and traded on advancetipsconcerningCitigroup takeoverdeals
thatemanated from aform erCitigroup investm entbankerwho,
apparently withoutasking foranythingin return, gavethem to
8 Petition for Writ ofCertiorariat 32, Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2014)
(No. 13-1837).
9 Id. at26.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at33.
13 See, e.g., Order at 12, United States v. Conradt, 2015 WL 480419 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 22, 2015) (No. 12 Cr. 877) (vacating four insider trading defendants guilty 
pleas in light of Newmans clarificationofthepersonalbenefitandtippeeknowl-
edge requirem ents of tipping liability for insider trading). 
14 See PetitionforWritofCertiorari, supra note 8, at 3234. 
15 United Statesv. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 84
U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015)(No. 15-137).
16 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3405 (U.S.
Jan. 19, 2016)(No. 15-628).
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hisbrother, whoin turn freelygavethem totheirbrother-in-law,
Salm an. Finding that [p]roofthattheinsiderdisclosedmaterial
nonpublicinform ationwith intenttobenefitatradingrelativeor
friend issufficienttoestablish thebreach offiduciary duty ele-
ment, the Ninth Circuit expressly declined to follow Newman.17
Itreliedinsteadon languagein Dirks, which stated thatabreach
offiduciary dutyismetwherean insider makes a gift of confi-
dential information to a trading relative or friend.18
Accordingly, theSupremeCourtisnow slated toaddressthe
question ofwhetherthe personalbenefitto the insiderthatis
necessary to establish a tippees liability for insider trading requires 
proof of an exchange that is objective, consequential, andrepre-
sentsatleasta potentialgain ofa pecuniary orsimilarly valu-
able nature, as the Second Circuit held in Newman, orwhether
itisenough toconstitutea fiduciary breach thattheinsiderin-
tendedtogiftatiptohisclosefam ilym ember, astheNinth Cir-
cuitheldin Salman.
While itisnotpossible to know atthe time ofthiswriting
whethertheCourtwilllimitNewman and onceagain allow cer-
tain tippeeprosecutionsfortradingon gifted tips, itseemshighly
dubious thatthe Courtwillor can singlehandedly correctthe
path ofU.S. insider law. Regardless ofwhether the personal
benefitrequirementisultim ately interpreted once again to in-
clude gifttipsand notjusttipsin exchange forsome potential
pecuniarybenefit, theCourtisunlikelyto, sua sponte, revisitits
long-standing holdings that(1)insider trading m ustresem ble
fraud by involving some fiduciary breach or m isappropriation;
(2) a tippees liability for trading on nonpublic inform ation nec-
essarily depends upon the tippers breach of his fiduciary duty; 
(3)atipperdoesnotbreach hisfiduciarydutymerelybydisclos-
ing confidential information but rather only receiving som e per-
sonal benefit in exchange for the disclosure;and (4)thatthe
tippee knows or should know thatthatthe tipperviolated his
fiduciary duty or that the tipper received a personalbenefit.
Now m orethan ever, U.S. insidertradinglaw rem ainsin needof
seriousreconsideration. Butjudicialactionisnotapanacea. Indeed,
17 United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 109394 (9th Cir. 2015) (declining 
tofollow Newman).
18 Dirksv. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664(1983).
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by virtue ofthe above listed holdingsthatpredate Newman, nu-
merousformsofunethicaland harmfulmarketbehaviorwillcon-
tinue to go unpunished and undeterred, regardless ofwhether
Newman islimitedorrevisedintheforthcomingSalman decision.
Despitebeing a m oralleaderand firstmoverin thefightto
secure the integrity ofthe securitiesmarketsby regulating in-
sidertradingmorethan thirtyyearsbeforeanyothercountry,19
theUnited Stateshasnow fallen significantly behind otherde-
veloped market economies in Europe that have adopted the
equal access to information theory pursuanttotheE.U. Market
AbuseDirective(M.A.D.).20 UnderthebroaderM.A.D. standard,
trading by anyone who possesses inside inform ation while that 
person knows, oroughtto have known, thatitis inside infor-
m ation is illegal.21 So too is disclosing inside information to 
any otherperson unlesssuch disclosure ismade in the normal
course of the exercise of his em ploym ent, profession or duties.22
Underthe M.A.D., there isno requirem entoffiduciary breach,
personal benefit or misappropriation.23 And by continuing to
im posesuch requirem ents, federallaw in theUnited Stateshas
becomepigeonholed in outdated, analyticallyoff-base, and overly
narrow theoriesofwhatmakestradingon thebasisofnonpublic
information m orallywrongful.
The resultantenforcementgapsthatfollow from these nar-
row Am erican theories and that allow blatantcheating to go
unpunished dangerously unmoor federal securities law from  its 
19 See, e.g., UtpalBhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of In-
sider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, 88 (Feb. 2002) (Until 1967, when France estab-
lished these laws, the United Stateswasthe only country thathad insider
trading laws.). 
20 See MarcoVentoruzzo, Comparing Insider Trading in the United States
and in the European Union: History and Recent Developments abstract(Euro-
pean Corp. GovernanceInst., Working PaperNo. 257/2014, 2014)(noting that
pursuanttotheE.U. MarketAbuseDirectives, num erousEuropean countries
have adopted the equal access to inform ation theory, which is m ore clear, 
easy to apply and broad). 
21 CouncilDirective2003/6/EC oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncil
of28 January2003 onInsiderDealingandMarketManipulation(MarketAbuse),
art. IV, 2003 O.J. (L 96)16 (EC), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT
/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003L0006&from=EN [https://perma.cc/AK5D-K4UX].
22 Id. art. 3.
23 See id. art. 4.
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expresslyintendedethicalfoundations.24 The 1934 Act was pur-
posed topreventinequitableand unfairpracticesand toinsure
fairnessin securitiestransactionsgenerally, whetherconducted
face-to-face, over the counter, or on exchanges.25 ThatAct, adopted
shortly afterthe 1933 SecuritiesActin the wake ofthe frauds
that preceded the Great Depression, was intended to substitute a 
philosophy offulldisclosureforthephilosophy ofcaveat emptor
andthustoachieveahigh standard ofbusinessethicsin these-
curities industry.26
Thesolution tothisproblem isnotsim plytooverturnorlim it
Newman,27 andthisArticleisnotintendedasam ereindictment
ofthatSecond Circuitdecision. Rather, Newman and the con-
cern ithas wroughtis largely the resultofthe failure ofthe
UnitedStatestohaveadedicatedandcom prehensivestatutede-
fining insidertrading28 and, in particular, a statutethatadopts
theequalityofaccesstheory.
Thisstatutoryvacuum hasrequired theSuprem eCourt(and
theSEC)tousesecuritiesfraud statutestodefinethecontours
ofunlawfulinsidertrading.29 Accordingly, even ifNewman were
tobelim ited bySalman, existingSupremeCourtprecedentlike
Chiarella v. United States (which held that a duty to [abstain 
24 SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 84748 (1968) (explaining 
congressionalintent).
25 Id. at848.
26 SEC v. CapitalGainsResearchBureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
27 See Andrew C. Whitm an, The Supreme Court Should Overturn U.S. v.
Newman and Recognize a New Type of Insider Trading Liability, AMERICAN
CRIM. L. REV. (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/aclr
-online/supreme-court-should-overturn-us-v-newman-and-recognize-new-type
-insider-trading-liability/[https://perma.cc/6KB2-K9QL](arguing, inter alia,
for the theory of enterprise liability, where liability would turn on (1) the 
tippers release of inform ation in order for tippee to trade, and (2) the tippees 
knowledge that such a schem e had been set up so that he m ay trade on som e 
insider inform ation). But see Petition forWritofCertiorari, supra note8, at
34(urgingtheSupremeCourttosimplyoverturn Newman andreturn tothe
Dirks standard).
28 See RobertW. McGee, Applying Ethics to Insider Trading, 77 J. BUS.
ETHICS 205, 214 (2008)(noting thatU.S. insidertrading legislation hasnot
defined the term  insider trading). 
29 See infra note42 (craftingliabilityforinsidertradingwhenabreachoffidu-
ciarydutyforpersonalgain(deceptiveself-dealing)ormisappropriationisfound).
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from trading or]disclose under§ 10(b)doesnotarise from the
mere possession of nonpublic material information)30 and Dirks
v. SEC (which renderedtippeeliability derivative of the tippers 
breach offiduciary duty and imposed an ill-conceived personal
benefitrequirem entin the firstplace)31 would stillcontinue to
posesubstantialconcerns.
Thesolution liesin thecreation ofa new statutoryprovision
defininginsidertradingasdistinctfrom otherformsofsecurities
fraud appropriately governed by the 1933 Securities Act and
1934 SecuritiesExchange Act. Such a provision would m ake it
unlawfultotradewhereoneisin possession ofmaterialnonpub-
licinformation thatisnot, atleastin principle, availabletoothers
throughindependentandotherwiselawfulduediligence.
Fortunately, thewidespreadpublicreaction toNewman32 has
prompted renewed interest in a legislative fix to U.S. insider
tradinglaw.33 Threenew billsarecurrentlypendingin Congress
30 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
31 The notion that a tippees liability depends upon the tippers breach of 
fiduciary duty and the tippees knowledge of such fiduciary breach was set 
forthbytheSupremeCourtin Dirks:
[A]tippee assum esa fiduciary duty to the shareholdersofa
corporation not to trade on materialnonpublic information
only when theinsiderhasbreached hisfiduciary duty tothe
shareholdersby disclosing the information to the tippee and
thetippeeknowsorshouldknow thattherehasbeenabreach.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). The requirementthata fiduciary
duty breach, forthe purposesofSection 10(b), only occursifthetipperwas
improperly motivated by personalgain was also set forth in Dirks, even
though itarguably contravened then-existing law. See id. at 662 ([T]he test 
iswhethertheinsiderpersonally willbenefit, directly orindirectly, from his
disclosure. Absentsome personalgain, there hasbeen no breach ofduty to
stockholders.). But see, e.g., Mosserv. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 275 (1951)(trustee
liabletoestateforauthorizingemployeestotakeadverseinteresttotrust, not-
withstanding hisselflessmotives);RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TRUSTS § 205
cmts. c, d(1959)(trusteeliableforactscausingdiminution ofvalueregardless
ofpersonalbenefit).
32 See, e.g., PeterJ. Henning, Fallout Builds from Ruling on Insider Trading,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2015), http:/dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/20/fallout-from
-insider-trading-ruling/?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/S3YD-L8TQ];Whitman, supra
note27.
33 See, e.g., Ban Insider Trading Act of2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong.
(2015);Stop IllegalInsiderTrading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015);Insider
TradingProhibitionAct, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. (2015).
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thatwould finally statutorily defineinsidertrading.34 Onesuch
billin theSenatewould adoptthe equality of access theory by 
making it unlawful to purchase, sell, or cause the purchase or 
saleofanysecurityon thebasisofm aterialinform ation thatthe
person knows orhas reason to know is not publicly available 
unless it is inform ation that the person has independently de-
veloped from  publicly available sources.35
ThisArticleaim stocontributetothelong-standingacadem ic
debateoverinsidertradingbyaddingtothevoicesofthosewho
haveargued thattrading on thebasisofinform ation thatisin-
accessibletothepublicisethicallyrepugnant,36 aswellasthose
from both sidesofthedebate whohave recognized thata dedi-
cated and com prehensive U.S. statutory provision thatdefines
insider trading should finally be enacted.37 Itargues thatany
efforttodefinewheninsidertradingisillegalmustmoresquarely
overlap with allofthe fundam entalreasons why itis morally
wrongful, instead ofcontinuing tomoorthelaw solely toprinci-
plesoffraudanditsattendantmechanismsoffiduciarydutybreach
ormisappropriation.
PartI ofthisArticlewillprovidea briefbackground on U.S.
insidertradinglaw. Itexplainsthat, in theabsenceofadedicated
statute, insider trading is and will continue to be conceived
m erely asa speciesoffraud, which requiresproofofa fiduciary
breach or misappropriation. Itfurther explains why affirming
Salm ans conviction and/or lim iting Newman would haveonly a
limited impact upon the governm ents effort to prom ote healthy, 
transparentmarketsandsafeguardinvestors.
PartII ofthis Article explains why trading on the basis of
non-publiclyavailableinformation isethicallywrongfulandought
34 See Ban InsiderTrading Actof2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. (2015);
Stop IllegalInsiderTradingAct, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015);InsiderTrading
ProhibitionAct, H.R. 1625, 114thCong. (2015).
35 S. 702.
36 See generally PatriciaH. Werhane, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 8 J. BUS.
ETHICS, 841 (1989); Kim Lane Scheppele, Its Just Not Right: The Ethics of 
Insider Trading, 56 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., 123 (1993);DanielOstas, When
Fraud Pays: Executive Self-Dealing and the Failure of Self-Restraint, 44 AM.
BUS. L.J. 571 (2007).
37 McGee, supra note 28, at 214 (To charge Congress with irresponsibility 
forthisomission isan understatement. Insidertradingisnow officiallyacrime,
yet nobody knows how to define the crim e.). 
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tobestatutorilyprohibited, regardlessoffiduciarybreach ormis-
appropriation. Weavingtogetherpreviouslydisconnectedthreads
ofresearch from theliteratureinmoralphilosophy, businessethics,
law, accounting, and finance, itarguesthatthewrongfulnessof
insidertradingderivesnotonlyfrom thefactthatitoffendsthe
sanctity offiduciary, fam ilial, agency, or employm entrelation-
ships or that it arguably stealsvaluefrom issuersand trading
counterparties but also because (1) it violates the basic re-
quirem entofequality of opportunity thatweexpectin oursocial
contractandconstitutescheating(seePartII.A);(2)itviolatescate-
goricalimperativestoactonlyon maxim sthatcan beuniversal-
ized and thattreatindividualsasm orethan meremeanstoour
profit-driven ends(seePartII.B);and(3)itdem onstrablyharms
thecapitalmarketsbyunderm iningtrust, deterringinvestm ent,
raisingthecostofequitycapital, anddecreasingmarketliquidity
accordingtoempiricalfinanceandaccountingresearch.38
Part III brings forth lessons learned from E.U. m em ber
states adoption of the Market AbuseDirective, highlightingthe
advantages to adopting the equal access theory in terms of its 
empirically demonstrated beneficialeffectsupon thecapitalmar-
ketsaswellasitsrelativeeaseofenforcementcom pared tocur-
rentU.S. law.
PartIV analyzesthreelegislativeproposalscurrently pending
inCongressthataim tofixU.S. insidertradinglaw afterNewman.
Itarguesforthe adoption, with minormodifications, ofS. 702,
which em bodies the equal access theory. 
TheConclusion includesremarksin supportoftheargum ent
thattheUnitedStatesshouldadoptaninsidertradingstatutethat
expressly prohibitsalltradesm ade on thebasisofmaterialin-
formation thatisnot, atleastin principle, accessibletoallother
investorsthrough independentandotherwiselawfuldiligence.
I. BACKGROUND ON U.S. INSIDER TRADING LAW
Commonly and colloquially termed insider trading, all ques-
tionableformsofthepracticegenerally involvetrading in finan-
cial instruments on the basis of material, nonpublic information.39
38 See infra PartII.C.
39 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW &
ECON. 1, 773 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (Insider 
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Despitethemisnomer, however, such tradingisnotlimitedtocor-
porate insiders, butalso encom passesthose working astem po-
raryinsiders(e.g., consultants)and outsiderswith noallegiance
to an issuer (e.g., hedge fund traders).40 Accordingly, for the
purposesofthisArticle, theterm  insider trading refers to the 
buyingorsellingofanyfinancialinstrum enton thebasisofma-
terial, non-publicly available information concerning such traded
financialinstrum entsregardlessofwhetherthetrading isdone
by(1)an insider(acorporateofficer, director, em ployee, control-
ling shareholder); (2) a tem porary insider, such as a lawyer, 
accountant, orconsultantworkingasan independentcontractor
ofthe issuer;or(3)an outsider, including any person orentity
unaffiliated with the issuer ofthe traded instrum entwho re-
ceives m aterial, nonpublic inform ation through intentionalor
inadvertenttips, selective disclosure, eavesdropping, ormisap-
propriation from corporatepersonnel.
A. Insider Trading as Fraud
Outside ofvery limited circumstances,41 insider trading is
generallyonlypunishableifitconstitutesaform offraudbyvirtue
ofbeing accom panied by thebreach ofa fiduciary duty forper-
sonalgain (deceptiveself-dealing)orm isappropriation (deceptive
theft).42 ThisislargelybecauseinsidertradingintheUnitedStates
trading, generallyspeaking, istradingin securitieswhileinpossessionofma-
terial nonpublic inform ation.). 
40 See, e.g., United States v. OHagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (law firm  
partner);Dirksv. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983)(securitiesanalyst).
41 Tradingon thebasisofmaterial, nonpublicinformation isactionablein
thecontextoftenderoffers, withoutabreach offiduciarydutyormisappropri-
ation, underSEC Rule14e-3. See 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-3 (2014). Likewise, corpo-
rateinsidersareprohibited from making short-swingprofitswithin a period
oflessthan six months, underthe prophylacticrule ofSection 16(b)ofthe
1934SecuritiesExchangeAct. See 15 U.S.C. §78p(b)(2015).
42 See, e.g., OHagan, 521 U.S. at 650 (holding that criminal liability 
under § 10(b) m ay be predicated on the m isappropriation theory); Dirks, 463
U.S. at 654 (duty arises ... from  the existence of a fiduciary relationship.);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233, 235 (1980) (We hold that a 
dutytodiscloseunder§10(b)doesnotarisefrom themerepossession ofnon-
public m aterial information but instead arises from  a specific relationship 
between two parties.). 
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isnotcurrently defined byany dedicated statute,43 butisinstead
mainly governed by general catch-all securities fraud provi-
sions like Section 10(b)ofthe 1934 Securities Exchange Act
(1934 Act), which prohibits any m anipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in connection with securities,44 and the
corresponding SEC Rule 10b-5, which bars the use of any de-
vice, scheme, or artifice to defraud.45 The Supreme Courthas
made clear, however, that even though these are catch-all pro-
visions, what they catch must be fraud46 and not every instance 
of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity.47
To constitute fraud, there m usttypically be an affirmative
falsestatement.48 If there is m erely silence as is the case with 
virtuallyallmodern securitiestransactionsconductedanonymously
over an exchange it is only fraudulent if there is a duty to dis-
close material facts in ones possession.49
B. Fiduciary Duty Breach, The Personal Benefit Requirement
and the Misappropriation Theory
Pursuanttothetwodom inanttheoriesofinsidertrading, the
classicaltheory(governingcorporateinsidersand tem poraryin-
siders)andthemisappropriationtheory(governingalltraderswho
stealinformation entrustedtothem), theSupremeCourthasheld
that the duty to disclose or abstain from  trading until the in-
formation ispublicgenerally only appliesto(1)peoplewhoare
recognized fiduciaries(corporate officers, directors, trustees, or
agents)orwhoareotherwiseinvolved in relationship oftrustand
confidence thatare breached for personalgain (deceptive self-
dealing);50 and (2) people who otherwise feign[ ] fidelity to the 
source of inform ation but then misappropriate such information 
43 McGee, supra note28, at214.
44 SecuritiesExchangeActof1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b)(2010).
45 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (2015).
46 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 23435. 
47 Id. at232.
48 See Cady, Roberts& Co., Exchange ActRelease No. 34-6668, 40 SEC
Docket907, 911 (1961).
49 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at232.
50 Id. at230.
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forpersonalgain (deceptivestealing).51 With regardtothelatter
category, theSEC hasadoptedRule10b5-2, which explainsthata
duty of trust or confidentiality exists whenever (1) a person agrees 
to m aintain inform ation in confidence; (2) the tipper and tippee 
have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such 
thattherecipientoftheinformation knowsorreasonablyshould
know thattheperson communicatingthematerialnonpublicinfor-
mation expects that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality; 
or (3) a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information 
from his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling unless it is other-
wiseclearthatnoexpectationoftrustandconfidenceexists.52
Undereithertheory, andbecauseinsidertradinglaw currently
is grounded in antifraud statutes, the obligation to disclose or ab-
stain from trading requires the existence ofa specialduty of
trustandconfidencethatdoesnotexistbetween tradingcounter-
partiesgenerally.53 Codifyingtheillegalityoftradingin violation
ofthese relationships, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-1 in August
2000, whichgenerallybarsthe
purchase orsale ofa security ofany issuer, on the basis of
materialnonpublicinformation aboutthatsecurity orissuer,
in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly,
indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the
shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the
source of the material nonpublic information.54
51 United States v. OHagan, 521 U.S. 642, 65355 (1997); see also SEC
Rule10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-2 (2015)(definingnon-exclusivedefinition
ofcircumstancesin which person hasa duty oftrustorconfidence forpur-
posesofthemisappropriationtheory).
52 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-2, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,738 (Aug. 24, 2000).
53 OHagan, 521 U.S. at 65253. 
54 SelectiveDisclosureand InsiderTrading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,737 (Aug. 24,
2000)(codifiedat17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-1(a))(emphasisadded). Thatruleexplains
that trading on the basis of material, nonpublic inform ation sim ply means 
trading while being aware of nonpublic inform ation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-
1(b). Therulealsoprovidesforaffirmativedefensesif, beforebecomingaware
of the inform ation, the person had (1) entered into a binding contract to 
purchase or sell the security; (2) instructed another person to purchase or 
sellthesecurity fortheinstructing persons account; or (3) adopted a writ-
ten plan for trading securities. Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(A)(1)(3). 
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C. Tipper-Tippee Liability
Because U.S. law only bars insider trading where itconsti-
tutesaform ofsecuritiesfraudinvolvingproofofafiduciarybreach
forpersonalbenefitorfeigned loyaltycoupled with misappropri-
ation, significantquestionsariseregardingtheliabilityofinsiders
whotip outsuch inform ation aswellasthosewhotradeon the
basisofsuch tips.
Clearly, theliabilityoftippersandtippeesdoesnotfitwellinto
the insider-trading-as-fraud regime. After all, tippers are not
necessarilytradingforthem selvesand thusdirectlyprofitingat
the expense ofthose to whom they owe fiduciary duties. And
certain outside tippees (like the defendants in Newman and
Salman)areneithercorporatefiduciariesnormisappropriators.
So, areinsidersalwaysallowed toprovidetips?And aretippees
always free to trade on m aterialnon-public information? The
seminalcasetoaddressthesequestionswasthe1983 Supreme
CourtcaseDirks v. SEC.
In Dirks, the Suprem e Court largely resolved the issue of
tipper liability by explaining that [n]ot only are insiders forbid-
den by theirfiduciary relationship from personally using undis-
closedcorporateinformation totheiradvantage, buttheyalsomay
notgivesuch inform ation toan outsiderforthesameimproper
purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain.55
However, corporateinsiderswhoprovidematerial, nonpublicin-
form ation to a third party that trades upon that information
(tippers) are generally not subjectto prosecution unless they
receivea personalbenefitin exchange,56 although they could be
laidofforpenalizedbytheSEC underRegulationFD.57
TheDirks court also recognized [t]he need for a ban on some 
tippee trading.58 Yet, because ofconcernsaboutinhibiting the
roleofmarketanalysts, theCourt expressly rejected im posing a 
duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly
55 Dirksv. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983).
56 See, e.g., United Statesv. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 447 (2d Cir. 2014);
463 U.S. at 66264. 
57 SelectiveDisclosureand InsiderTrading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24,
2000)(tobecodifiedat17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 243, 249).
58 Dirks, 463 U.S. at659.
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receives m aterial nonpublic from  an insider and trades on it.59
Accordingly, theDirks court held that a tippee assumes a fidu-
ciary duty to the shareholdersofa corporation notto trade on
materialnonpublicinformationonlywhentheinsiderhasbreaches
his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the infor-
mation tothetippeeand thetippeeknowsorshould know that
there has been a breach.60 Tippeeliabilityisthusunderstoodto
be derivative of (and dependent upon) the tippers breach. 
So when doesa tipperbreach hisfiduciary duty?The Dirks
m ajority explained that all disclosures of confidential infor-
m ation arenotinconsistentwith thedutyinsidersowetoshare-
holders.61 It took the position that whether disclosure is a
breach of fiduciary duty depends in largeparton thepurposeof
the disclosure and the test is whether the insider personally 
will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.62 Itthus
stated that [a]bsent some personal gain, there has been no breach 
of duty to stockholders.63 Accordingly, thecourtdirected other
courts to focus on whether the insider receives a direct or indirect 
personalbenefitfrom thedisclosure, such asapecuniarygain or
areputationalbenefitthatwilltranslate into future earnings.64
Becausedirectevidenceofsuchapersonalbenefitm aybedif-
ficulttoobtain, theDirks courtnoted thatthereareoften facts
and circumstancesthatwilljustify an inferenceconcerning the
existence ofa personalbenefit. For example, the Courtstated
there m ay be a relationship between the insider and the recipi-
entthatsuggestsaquid pro quo from thelatter, oran intention
tobenefittheparticular recipient.65 It added that the elements 
offiduciary duty and exploitation ofnonpublicinformation also
existwhen an insiderm akesagiftofconfidentialinform ation to
a trading relative or friend, because [t]he tip and trade resemble 
tradingbytheinsiderhim selffollowed bya giftoftheprofitsto
the recipient.66
59 Id. at658.
60 Id. at660.
61 Id. at 66162. 
62 Id. at662.
63 Id.
64 Id. at663.
65 Id. at664.
66 Id.
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D. The Implications of Newm an and The Limits of Salm an
As noted above, the Second Circuits opinion in Newman made
itm oredifficulttoprosecutetippeesin twoways. First, thecourt
madeithardertoprovethatthetipperbreachedhisfiduciaryduty
by receiving a personal benefit. Second, the court made it harder 
to satisfy Dirks requirement that the tippee knew or should 
have known that there has been a breach of the tippers fidu-
ciary duty. WhiletheSupremeCourthasan opportunityin itsre-
view ofSalman torevisitand clarify the definition of personal 
benefit (so as to once again allow prosecutor to punish recipients 
ofgiftedtips, notjustthosewhoreceiveaquid pro quo)itisunlikely
to m odify the knowledge requirementannounced in Newman.
Moreover, becausetheCourtisconstrainedtoconceiveofinsider
tradingonlyasaspeciesoffraud,67 theCourtisalsounlikelyto
revisitseveralotherfundam entalrequirements ofU.S. insider
tradinglaw thatallow certainmarketcheaterstogounpunished.
In Newman, theSecond Circuitseem inglylimited thedefini-
tion of the personal benefit required to constitute fiduciary breach 
bytheinsidetipperand increased thequantum ofevidencenec-
essaryforthejurytoinferthatthetipperreceived an improper
personalbenefitbasedon thetippers close relationship with the 
tippee. Rejecting the governments proffer of evidence that one 
insider gave information to his business school friend in ex-
change for career advice and that another insider gave infor-
mation tohisfriend from church, theNewman courtstated that
the personal benefit received in exchange for confidential infor-
mation must be of some consequence.68 Itadded thatthegovern-
ment may not prove the receipt of a personal benefit by the mere 
fact of a friendship, particularly of a casual or social nature69
and held that a personal benefit inference is im permissible in 
67 There are express indications in both Chiarella and Dirks thatthe Su-
premeCourtfeltconstrainedbycongressionalintent(ortheabsencethereof).
See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 23334 (1980) (stating that 
the form ulation of different duty from  current law should not be undertaken 
absent som e explicit evidence of congressional intent); Dirks, 463 U.S. at656
(arguing that the SECs position differslittlefrom theview thatwerejected
asinconsistentwithcongressionalintentin Chiarella.). 
68 UnitedStatesv. Newman, 773 F.3d438, 452 (2dCir. 2014).
69 Id.
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the absence ofproofofa m eaningfully close relationship that
generatesan exchangethatisobjective, consequential, and rep-
resentsatleastapotentialgain ofapecuniaryorsimilarlyvalu-
able nature.70 Based on thisholding, thegovernmenthasraised
substantialconcernsregarding theability toprosecutethosewho
providetipsasgifts.71
By contrast, in Salman, theNinth Circuittook a m oretradi-
tionalview oftheDirks precedent. Noting that the Second Circuits 
Newman opinion wasnotbindingupon it, theNinth Circuitheld
thatthe personalbenefitrequirem entwas satisfied where one
provides a gift of confidential information to a trading relative.72
Accordingly, because the governmentpresented directevidence
thatthe Citigroup tipperintended to provide a giftofmarket-
sensitive information to hisbrother, the personalbenefitrequire-
mentwassatisfied.
With its grantofcertiorariin Salman, the Supreme Court
has an opportunity to clarify that the definition of personal 
benefit includes the intangible benefitsoneobtainsbygiftingtips
tooutsiders. Doingsowouldm erelyrequiretheCourttoem pha-
size its lesson from Dirks that the elements of fiduciary duty 
and exploitation ofnonpublic information also exist when an
insiderm akesagiftofconfidentialinformation toatradingrela-
tive or friend, because [t]he tip and trade resemble trading by the 
insider him self followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient. 
By affirming Salmans conviction, the Court could also once 
again permit the jury to infer the existence of (and the tippees 
awareness of) the tippers personal benefit based on the exis-
tenceofaclosepersonalrelationshipbetween thetipperandhis
im mediatetippee.
Nevertheless, itis im portantnotto expectfrom the Court
m ore than itisable to give in Salman. Indeed, due to the fact
70 Id.
71 See Petition ForWritofCertiorari, supra note 8, at 32 (arguing that a 
casein which an insidergiftsinsideinformation toa trading friend orrelative
will not m eet the Second Circuits new standard absent evidence that the re-
lationship was m eaningfully close and that the insider stood to obtain m oney 
(or som ething of sim ilar value) via an exchange and noting that [s]uch 
evidence will not always exist). 
72 United Statesv. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015)(quoting
Dirks, 463 U.S. at664(1983)).
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that, with limited exception, U.S. statutory law only prohibits
insidertrading when itfallswithin the am bit of fraud, there 
areseveralfundamentalinterpretationsthattheCourtwilllikely
feelconstrainedorinclinedtofollow.
First, sincetheCourtisconstrainedtofitinsidertradinginto
anti-fraud provisions, it is unlikely that the Court will dispense 
with therequirementthattradingbeaccom paniedbythebreach
ofa relationship oftrustand confidenceforpersonalbenefit. As
noted above, fraud requireseitheran affirm ativem isstatement
oran omission coupledwith adutytodisclose. Accordingly, even
ifNewman weretobecurtailedinSalman, personswhotradeon
material, nonpublicinformation aftereavesdroppingon thecon-
versation ofa person to whom they do nototherwise owe any
dutyoftrustand confidencem aycontinuetodoso, even ifthey
know thatsuch person isan insiderwho justinadvertently di-
vulgedm aterial, nonpublicinform ation.73
Second, the Courts forthcoming decision in Salman willlikely
not fundamentally depart from the understanding that a tippees 
liability fortrading on nonpublicinformation necessarily depends
upon the tippers breach of his fiduciary duty. Apartfrom the
factthatthisunderstanding from Dirks haspersisted formore
than thirty yearsand neitherparty hasrequested theCourtto
overturn thatcase, theCourtwilllikelyfinditselfconstrainedto
continue to ground the tippees obligation to abstain or disclose 
in the tippees participation in the tippers breach, lest it im pose 
dutiesupon everyonein theabsenceofCongressionalauthoriza-
tiontodoso.
Third, regardless of how the personal benefit requirement 
isultim ately defined, theCourtin Salman willlikely leaveun-
disturbed its holding from Dirks thata tipperdoesnotbreach
hisfiduciarydutym erelybydisclosingconfidentialinformation,
73 See, e.g., SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 762, 766 (W.D. Okla. 1984)
(dismissinginsidertradingchargesagainstformerfootballcoach whotraded
on information concerning an upcoming corporate liquidation thathe inadver-
tentlyoverheardduringatrackmeetfrom amanheknew wasontheliquidating
companys board); see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 65960 ([S]om e tippees m ust 
assum e an insiders duty to the shareholders not because they receive inside 
information, butratherbecauseithasbeenmadeavailabletothem improperly. 
(emphasisadded)).
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butratheronlybyhavingan impropermotive(such asreceiving
som e personal benefit in exchange for the disclosure). There 
are severalgood reasonsforthe Courtto reconsiderthisinter-
pretation. Notably, shareholderscanbeharmedbyunauthorized
disclosuresregardlessofwhetherthetipperpersonallybenefits,
and thereisestablished corporatelaw providing thatcorporate
fiduciaries in othercontexts can breach theirduties ofcare or
goodfaith withoutapersonalbenefitorself-dealing.74 Neverthe-
less, itisdoubtfulthattheCourtwillalteradeterm ination that
hasstood fordecades. Accordingly, even ifNewman were to be
limited underSalman, where an issuers authorized senior man-
agementreceivesnoindividualpersonalbenefit, theyareunlikely
tobepunished forintentionally and selectively disclosing infor-
mation to a controlling shareholder or outside trader.75 While
the SEC m ightbring a civiloradministrative enforcementac-
tion in respectofsuch conductandimposeamonetarypenalty,76
[n]o failure to m ake a public disclosure required solely by [Reg-
ulation FD]shallbedeemed tobea violation ofRule10b-5 (17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5) under the Securities Exchange Act.77
74 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding
directorliableforshareholderlossesoccaisonedbybreach offiduciarydutyof
care, notwitstandingtheabsenseofanyclaimsofself-dealingorbadfaith).
75 See, e.g., Stephen D. Cookeetal., SEC Continues to Prosecute Regula-
tion Fair Disclosure Violations, PAUL HASTINGS (Nov. 2010), http://www.paul
hastings.com/Resources/Upload/Publications/1773.pdf [https://perma.cc/UM45
-AAEE](citing SEC settlementoveralleged Regulation FD violations after
Office Depot, and its then CEO and CFO, selectively signaled to analysts and 
institutional investors that the company would not meet analysts earnings 
estim ates for the second quarter of 2007); see also ArtA. Durnev& Amrita
S. Nain, Does Insider Trading Regulation Deter Private Information Trading?
International Evidence, 15 PAC. BASIN FIN. J. 409, 411 (2007)(notingthatinsider
trading may provideincentivesforissuerstoreward controlling shareholders
forlaxmonitoring).
76 See, e.g., Cookeetal., supra note75 (explainingthat, withoutadmitting
ordenyingliabilityforRegulation FD violations, HomeDepotpaid a$1 million
civilpenaltyanditsexecutivespaid$50,000 each).
77 See 17 C.F.R. §243.102;see also Baker& Kanjorski, SEC WrittenState-
ment(May 17, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/051701wssec.htm
#P97_22392 [https:/perma.cc/6BX3-A86P] (noting that the prospect of private 
liability under Regulation FD could contribute to a chilling effect on issuer 
communications. Accordingly, theregulation expresslyprovidesthatafailure
to make a disclosure required solely by Regulation FD willnotviolate the
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Fourth, the Courtisunlikely to modify the Newman courts 
holding that, in order to satisfy Dirks requirem ent that the 
tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach,78
prosecutorsm ustshow thatthedefendant-tradersknew (orcon-
sciouslyavoided knowing)thatthe tippee knew that an insider 
disclosed confidential inform ation and that he did so in ex-
change for a personal benefit.79 Asa m atterofdueprocessand
established substantiveprinciplesofcriminallaw regardingmens
rea, theCourtwilllikely uphold thisinterpretation. Thereason
forthisisasfollows:ifa fiduciarybreach continuestobea nec-
essary elementofinsider trading liability, and (under Dirks),
only the tippers receipt of a personalbenefitcan transform an
otherwise unauthorized and damaging disclosure ofnonpublic
information into a fiduciary breach, then the defendant-tippees 
dueprocessrightstonottobeconvicted withoutproofofallthe
elementsofthecrime(includingcriminalintent)should require
the tippees awareness that the tipper received a personal bene-
fit.80 Withoutknowledgethatthetipperreceivedapersonalben-
efit, itwould beimpossibleforthedefendantstohavefairnotice
thattheywouldbecommittingacrimeiftheytradedontheinfor-
mation. In effect, this m eans thattraders savvy enough to re-
m ain plausiblyignorantofthesourceofthetip theyreceivewill
remain untouchable.81 And indeed, itwillbe nearly im possible
to prosecute remote tippees, like the hedge fund defendantsin
Newman, whoareseverallevelsremovedfrom theoriginalsource.
In sum , because current U.S. insider trading law rem ains
moored tothenotionsoffraud, fiduciary duty breach, and m is-
appropriation and doesnotcurrently ban insidertrading when
generalantifraud rule, Rule 10b-5. Thus, private plaintiffscannotrely on a
Regulation FD violation asabasisforaprivatesecuritiesfraud lawsuit. The
regulation is enforceable only by the Com m ission.).
78 Dirks, 463 U.S. at660 (emphasisadded).
79 UnitedStatesv. Newman, 773 F.3d438, 455 (2dCir. 2014).
80 Cf. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 62425 (1994) (requiring the 
governmentto prove thatthe defendantknew thathis gun had prohibited
featuresofan automaticweapon beforeconvictinghim ofpossessingan unregis-
teredmachinegun);Turnerv. UnitedStates, 396 U.S. 398, 420 (1970)(Black,
J., dissenting) ([C]onstitutional due process requires the Government to prove 
each elementbeyond a reasonabledoubtbeforeitcan convicttheaccused of
thecrimeitdeliberately and clearly defined.). 
81 See Newman, 773 F.3dat438.
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a person ism erelyin possession ofinform ation thattheyknow
is not accessible to others, m erely overturning or clarifying
Newman in itsupcom ingSalman decision willlikelyfallshortof
prohibitingunethicaltrading. Onlya statutethatrecognizesin-
sidertradingascheatingandnotjustfraud can accom plish that
goal. Only a statute that unmoors a tippee-traders liability for 
insider trading from the tippers breach of fiduciary duty will allow 
prosecutorsto hold tippeesliable forexploiting theirpositionsof
accesstothedisadvantageofothertraders. Only a statutethat
recognizestheindependentwrongfulnessoftradingon m aterial
corporateinformation thatthetraderknowsorshould know that
othersdonothaveaccesstothrough theirown independentand
lawfuldiligence can truly facilitatean honest, transparentand
healthymarket.
E. The Extent of Insider Trading
Although exactfigures on the prevalence ofinsidertrading
remain elusiveduetothesecrecywith which such practitioners
operatetoavoid detection by theexchangesand theSEC, a re-
centstudybyMcGillUniversityProfessorAugustinandNew York
UniversityProfessorsBrennerandSubrahm anyam foundempir-
icalevidencesuggestingthatnearlyonequarterofallmergersor
acquisitionsinvolvingpubliclytradedcompaniesmayinvolvesome
kind ofinsidertrading.82 The prevalence ofsuch trading has led
som etoconclude, asProfessorMcGee has, that [t]here are just 
toom anyindividualswhoareviolatingthelaw tofindandpros-
ecute them all.83 Yetthemagnitudeoftheproblem oframpant
cheating oughtnotlead us to conclude thatsociety is entirely
powerlesstom inimizeit. Som ethingcan bedone, butitmustbe
donebystatute. Andstatutorychangesrequirepoliticalwill. The
82 Patrick Augustin, M. Brenner, etal., InformedOptionsTradingPriorto
M&A Announcements:Insider Trading? 2 (May 2014)(unpublished manu-
script), http://irrcinstitute.org/reports/informed-options-trading-prior-to-ma-an
nouncements-insider-trading/[https://perma.cc/Z3KN-45P9] (Approxim ately 
25% ofallthecasesin oursamplehaveabnormalvolumes[in equityoptions
written on thetargetfirmsin theU.S. overthe30 dayspreceding M&A an-
nouncements]thataresignificantatthe5% level, andfor15% thesignificance
is at a 1% level.). 
83 McGee, supra note 28, at 21213. 
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firststeptofomentsuch politicalwillistoappreciatewhythesta-
tusquoiswrongfrom bothmoralandeconomicperspectives.
II. WHY TRADING ON THE BASIS OF NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
INFORMATION SHOULD BE BANNED, REGARDLESS OF
FIDUCIARY BREACH OR MISAPPROPRIATION
Tounderstand why a statutory prohibition againsttrading on
thebasisofinform ation thatisnot, atleastin theory, accessible
toothersisneeded, itishelpfultostartwith thefoundation of
such law:ethics. AsProfessorThomasDunfeehaseloquentlyex-
plained, the dom ains of ethics and law are synergistically and 
intimatelyrelated. Theyaresomuch so, thatneithercan befully
meaningfulorrealizedwithouttheother. Law withoutreference
toethicsand comm unity moralvaluesisin dangerofbecom ing
disconnected from the public will.84
I subm itthattheethicalim perativetocurtailcheatingbyle-
gallyprohibitingtradingon thebasisofmaterialinformation that
isnot, in principle, availabletoallotherinvestorsthrough inde-
pendentandotherwiselawfuldiligenceisevidentundersocialcon-
tractarian, deontological, andconsequentialisttheoriesofjustice.
A. Insider Trading Violates the Social Contract
ThisSection willmaketheethicalargumentbasedon Rawlsian
socialcontracttheory. I shallfirstendeavortolend contentand
specificity totheoft-m aligned notion of fairness by explaining 
whyitrequiresequalityof access toinformation, butnotequality
ofinformation, skill, sophistication, financialresources, orluck.
I shallthen trytoexplain, in concreteterms, whytradingon the
basisofinform ation thatisnot, in principle, availabletoothers
through independentand otherwiselawfuldiligenceconstitutes
the moral wrong of cheating, irrespective of any fiduciary breach 
ormisappropriation.
1. Insider Trading Denies Equality of Opportunity
So, what exactly is meant by fairness? Professor Scheppele 
has aptly recognized that [d]iscussions of the fairness of insider 
84 ThomasW. Dunfee, On the Synergistic, Interdependent Relationship of
Business Ethics and Law, 34AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 319 (1996).
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trading have been plagued by charges thatfairness is a fuzzy
idea thatneeds to be clarified with the pure logicofeconomic
theory and have been criticized for failing to provide any clearly 
defined sense of what would be prohibited.85 Toooften, itseems,
straw manargumentsaresetupsimplysothattheycaneasilybe
knocked down. Professor McGees argument in Applying Ethics
to Insider Trading isanexampleofthis.86 In oversimplifiedterms,
McGee defines the so-called fairness argument as one asserting 
that [t]he market should be fair to all participants, which he 
seem ingly interpretsasrequiring sym m etry ofinformation and
skill.87 Aftersetting up the straw man, he then knocksitdown,
noting it is not possibleordesirabletoeverhavea levelplaying
field in the realm  of economics.88 Hecontendsthatthetrueun-
fairness lies in forcing experts who work 60 hours a week to 
gatherinform ation aspartoftheirjob ... todisclosesuch infor-
m ation to people who have done nothing to earn it.89 Thoseofus
without inside information, asserts McGee, are like Alaskan ba-
nana farmers seeking to impose punitive regulations or higher 
tax burdens to compensate for the fact that some individuals or 
groups are naturally better at some things than others.90
So, to be clear: perfect fairness i.e., equalityofskill, sophis-
tication, financial resources, information, luck, or outcome is not, 
hasneverbeen, andprobablyneverwillbeafundamentalfeature
ofthesecuritiesmarkets. Andfew ofus, ifofferedaRawlsian ex
anteopportunity todevisesecuritieslawsfrom behind a veilof
ignorance in the OriginalPosition,91 would probably wantitto
be. Whilewelikelywould seek tomaximizeourminimumsin the
probableeventthatwedid notbecom eWallStreettycoonsonce
the veillifts, we probably would notdemand absolute equality
onm ostfronts.
85 Scheppele, supra note 36, at 125 (citing Easterbrook & Fischels comment 
atpage251 ofThe Economic Structure of Corporate Law that they suspect 
thatfew peoplewhoinvokeargumentson fairnesshavein mind anyparticular
content for the term .) 
86 McGee, supra note 28, at 21011. 
87 Id. at210.
88 Id. at211.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS:A RESTATEMENT 8089 (Erin Kelly 
3ded., 2003).
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The ability to accumulate wealth and achieve economic de-
velopm ent which, in principle, benefits us all and is to the 
greatestbenefitoftheleast-advantaged members of society92
is often realized through the buying and selling ofsecurities
preciselybecausetherearedifferencesin thesophistication and
skillpossessed bytradersofthesamesecurity. In largemeasure,
such differencesareinevitable;somespendtheirlivesmastering
themarkets, whileotherssim plydabble. Thesedifferencesallow
certain securitiestraderstomake m oney in a transaction and 
cause others to lose money precisely because they lead to dif-
fering judgments as to the value (future cash flow)ofa given
security relative to its currentprice. Yetthis type ofarguable
unfairness is som ething thatmostofus living in a capitalist
society would probably acceptas largely inevitable and indeed
morallypermissible. Partofouracceptanceofsuchasystem liesin
thefactthatitseemingly encourageshard work, duediligence,
and thorough analysis. It provides m ostofus with the belief
that, if we too becom e educated oratleastifwehiresom ebody
educated and experienced to manage our m oney we can also 
eventuallysucceedinthem arket.
Mostofus are probably also willing to acceptthattrading
gains and losses are m orally permissible and should continue 
to be legally permissible even if they are just the result of 
dum b luck. Although some have defended insider trading, in
part, asam eanstom inimizechancein theallocation oftrading
gainsandlossesin themarket,93 m ostofusprobablyperceiveno
problem with the influence ofluck so long as the allocation of
luck is truly random . The ubiquity ofstate lotteries suggests
thatmostofuswould probablynotwantCongresstoforceusto
disgorgeprofitsbasedon pureluck, even ifitwerepossibletodo
so. After all, in the stock m arket like in any casino we, too 
mighteventuallychooseawinner, getlucky, andbecomerich.
Astodifferencesin financialresourcesamongsttraders, many
ofusprobablyrecognizethata blanketruledenyingthemarket
92 Id. at 43 (explaining the Difference Principle). Notably, this Article does 
notintendtosuggestthattheleastadvantagedamongstusarealways, inpractice,
servedbyinequalitiesofwealth.
93 See Werhane, supra note 36, at 84244 (challenging Henry Mannes 
assertion ofsuch an argument);see also generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
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advantagesthatmoneybringswould alsobeundesirable. Apart
from theperverseincentivesforfree-ridingthatsucharulewould
produceduetotherem ovaloftheprofitm otive, itwould alsobe
difficultto m aintain for long ifwe are to m aintain a free and
capitalistsociety.94 Even ifsomemightoccasionallywanttoelim-
inate certain market advantages occasioned by differences in
wealth for example, by barring well-financedhigh-speedtraders
from purchasing closerserver proxim ity to the Exchanges95 or
gaining access to the University of Michigans Consumer Senti-
m entIndex from Thomson Reuters 300 or 302 seconds earlier
than everyone else96 such instances are best dealt with on a 
case-by-case basis, and with rules that limit the definition of
inside inform ation to specific information related to a particu-
larissuer, ratherthangeneralm arketinformation, which can be
independentlygatheredin lieuofpurchase.
ButthefactthatAmerican societytoleratesthesedeviations
from what might be deemed perfect fairness (i.e., perfect 
equality)in thesecuritiesmarketsshould notbetaken tom ean
thatother, more fundamentalaspectsoftrading fairnessought
notbeexpected, dem anded, and ultim atelyensured in oursecu-
ritiesmarkets.
I subm it, with substantialcreditto John Rawls, thatapart
from equalbasicliberties(which wouldnotincludethelibertyto
harm others or society), the most fundamental guarantee of
fairness that most of us would probably want if we did not 
otherwisehaveentrenchedprivilegeisequalityofopportunity.97
Appearingseventeen timesin theRepublican Partyplatform and
94 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 16163 (1st ed. 1974) 
(WiltChamberlain example);see also MICHAEL SANDEL, JUSTICE:WHATS THE
RIGHT THING TO DO 6466 (1sted. 2010)(MichaelJordanexample).
95 MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS:A WALL STREET REVOLT 10 (2014).
96 PeterLattman, Thomson Reuters to Suspend Early Peeks at Key Index,
N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/thom son
-reuters-to-suspend-early-peeks-at-key-index/?_r=0 [https:/perma.cc/853H-C6L2].
97 RAWLS, supra note 91, at 4243 (Social and economic inequalities are to 
satisfy two conditions:first, they are to be attached to officesand positions
open toallunderconditionsoffairequality ofopportunity;and second, they
aretobetothegreatestbenefitoftheleast-advantagedmembersofsociety(the
difference principle.)). 
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twenty-onetimesin theDemocraticPartyplatform,98 theconcept
of opportunity forms a cornerstone of our national identity and 
pervadesmany ofourpublicpolicy decisions, from education to
employmenttohealthcare. Itisalsoahallmarkoftheethicalcodes
adopted by internationalorganizations and m ulti-nationalcor-
porationsalike,99 andservesasthebasisformanycontem porary
business-relatedinitiativeslikemicrofinance.100
Whilewemightnotallagreeastohow besttofacilitatesuch
opportunityin num eroussocialcontextsoralwayspracticewhat
ispreached, thisArticlesubmitsthat, in thecontextofthesecu-
ritiesmarkets, theethicalm andateofequalopportunity trans-
latesintotheneedforalegalrequirem entofequality of access to
corporateinformation. Withouttheopportunity toaccessmean-
ingfulinformation, itisscarcelypossibletom akeinform edjudg-
ments about ones investm ents. And without informed judgm ent, 
manyofuswouldprobablyprefertorefrainfrom investingatall.
Here, though, itiscriticalnottoconflatetheclaim thatfair-
nessrequiresequality of access to information with impossibly 
utopian calls for equality of information.101 Yetthisistheerror
m adebycertain academ ics102 and bya m ajority oftheSupreme
Courtin bothChiarella v. United States andDirks v. SEC.103
98 2012 Republican Party Platform, GOP.COM, https://cdn.gop.com/docs/2012
GOPPlatform.pdf[https://perma.cc/EF3H-VF27], May 2014 and 2012 Democratic
Party Platform, DEMOCRATS, https://www.democrats.org/party-platform [https://
perma.cc/X6S3-22NL].
99 Dinah Payneetal., A Global Code of Business Ethics, 16 J. BUS. ETHICS
1727, 1729 (1997)(citing the United NationsInternationalLaborOrganiza-
tions declaration of equality of opportunity and treatm ent as one of the key 
issuesconcerningforeign directinvestmentin developingcountries, and citing
the Johnson & Johnson Credo, which states that [t]here must be equal oppor-
tunity for em ploym ent, developm ent and advancem ent for those qualified). 
Id. at1731.
100 See Roland Bardy, etal., Foreign Investment and Ethics: How to Con-
tribute to Social Responsibility by Doing Business in Less-Developed Coun-
tries, 106 J. BUS. ETHICS 267, 271, 276 (Micro-financing has evolved in 
response to the inability of traditional financial institutions to ensure fair 
equality of opportunity.). 
101 Scheppele, supra note36, at125.
102 See McGee, supra note 28, at 21011. 
103 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980);463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983).
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Chiarella was a case involving a mark-up man at a financial 
printingcompanywhotraded in thesecuritiesofatakeovertar-
get com pany after learning its identity from confidentialand
redacted dealbooksgiven tohisem ployerby theacquiring com -
pany.104 Although the governm ent prosecuted and convicted
Chiarella ofinsider trading, a majority ofthe Suprem e Court
reversed, holding thatbecauseChiarella wasnotan insider, he
owed no affirmative duty to disclose the nonpublicinform ation
he obtained.105 With the fledgling misappropriation theory not
yetproperlybeforetheCourt,106 them ajoritybelieved thatthey
could not affirm  the conviction without recognizing a general 
duty between allparticipants in markettransactions to forgo
actions based on material, nonpublic inform ation107 oradopting
a parity of information rule, requiring perfect inform ational 
sym m etryam ongstallm arketparticipants.108
In actuality, therewereotherviableoptionstodecideChiarella,
aspresentedbythedissentingjustices, which didnotrequireper-
fect equality of inform ation. Most notably, Justice Blackm un
joined by Justice Marshall explained that he would hold that 
persons having access to confidential material inform ation that 
isnotlegallyavailabletoothersgenerallyareprohibitedbyRule
10b-5 from engagingin schem estoexploittheirstructuralinfor-
m ationaladvantages through trading in affected securities.109
Indeed, it was Chiarellas access to the dealbooksthatwasthe
proximateand structuralcauseofhisinform ationaladvantage,
ratherthan any true financialacum en ordiligence on hispart
that could not now be accom plished with a quick Google
search.110 Thus, aspointed outbydissentingJusticesBlackmun
andMarshall, arulebarringChiarellafrom exploitinghisposition
104 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at224.
105 Id. at231.
106 See id. at 23536 (declining to decide whether the misappropriation theory 
presented by thegovernmenthad meritbecauseitwasnotsubmitted tothe
jury). But see id. at240 (Berger, C.J., dissenting)(expressingwillingnesstohold
that a person who has m isappropriated nonpublic inform ation has an abso-
lute duty to disclose that inform ation or to refrain from  trading). 
107 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at233.
108 Id.
109 Id. at251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at247 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ofaccessagainsthiscounterparties, whom heknew couldnotpos-
sibly lawfully access the sam e information, could have form ed
thebasisforalimitedruleaboutwhy, underthecircum stances,
he should havebeen undera uniqueobligation toabstain from
trading.111 In fact, a similar rule was adopted nearly twenty
yearsearlierbytheSEC in thegroundbreakingm atterofCady,
Roberts.112 Yet, the m ajority in Chiarella took painsto rejecta
needlessly broad parity-of-information theory, even though the 
dissent by Justices Blackmun and Marshallexplained, as this
Articlehasattem ptedto explain, that there isasignificantcon-
ceptualdistinction between parity ofinform ation and parity of
access to m aterial information.113
Dirks involved a securitiesanalystwhowascensured by the
SEC becausehereceivedand then passed on tohisinstitutional
clients a form er insiders tip concerning corporate fraud at the 
issuer, and the clientstraded on the inform ation before itwas
disclosedtothepublicortheSEC.114 Afterappealofhiscensure,
themajorityoftheSuprem eCourtdeterm ined thatDirkscould
notbe held liable forinsidertrading.115 The majority reasoned
thatDirksdid notfitintotheclassicaltheoryofinsidertrading
because Dirks was neither an insider nor a temporary insider
underan obligation todiscloseorabstain from trading.116 More-
over, the stillnascentm isappropriation theory would nothave
111 Id. at251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
112 Cady, Roberts, & Co., ExchangeActReleaseNo. 34-6668, 40 SEC Docket
907, 912 (1961)(noting thatcertain people were subjectto the disclose-or-
abstain obligation where there is [1] the existence of a relationship giving 
access, directlyorindirectly, toinformation intended tobeavailableonlyfor
acorporatepurposeandnotforthepersonalbenefitofanyone, and ... [2]the
inherentunfairnessinvolvedwhereapartytakesadvantageofsuch information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom  he is dealing.). Notably, the 
Com m issions interpretation of the Cady, Roberts rule would have imposed
the disclose-or-abstain obligations on certain insiders, while the rule for 
which this Article advocates would impose iton everyone when they have
inside access. Id. at911 (internalquotationsomitted).
113 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at233 & 252 n.2 (1980)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
114 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 64849 (1983). 
115 Id. at666.
116 Id. at 665 (It is undisputed that Dirks him self was a stranger to [the 
issuerwhose shareswere traded]with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its
shareholders.). 
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appliedtoDirksbecausetheinform ation hereceivedandshared
wasnotstolen in breach ofconfidencetothesource,117 butrather
wasgiven tohim by theinsiderwith noexpectation ofprivacy.
Themajoritythereforecrafted a new tipper-tippeetheoryoflia-
bility, under which some tippees must assume an insiders duty to 
theshareholdersnot because they receive inside information, but
rather because it has been made available to them improperly.118
Itthusheld:
[A]tippeeassumesafiduciarydutytotheshareholdersofacor-
poration notto tradeon materialnonpublicinformation only
when theinsiderhasbreached hisfiduciary duty totheshare-
holders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the
tippeeknowsorshouldknow thattherehasbeenabreach.119
The majority added that [w]hether disclosure is a breach of
dutythereforedependsin largeparton thepurposeofthedisclo-
sure .... The testis whether the insider personally willbenefit,
directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.120
The Dirks majoritys decision not to hold thata tippee as-
sumesadutytodiscloseorabstain from tradingbyvirtueofthe
mere factthat(s)he receives nonpublicinformation (a position
advocated bytheSEC)wasprompted, in largepart, byitserro-
neous belief that holding otherwise would require equal infor-
mation among all traders.121 Yet, thisisnotthe case. A much
narrowerrule, basedon theequalityofaccesstheory, couldhave
recognized any wrongfulness in the former insiders and Dirkss 
behavior(i.e., sharing theinformation with likely traderswith-
outfirstnotifyingtheSEC orthepublic)whileatthesam etim e
preserving incentives for analysts to ferret out and analyze 
information122 andensuringfundamentalmarketfairness. Based
117 See United States v. OHagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (The m isap-
propriation theory holds that a person com m its fraud in connection with a 
securitiestransaction, and thereby violates§ 10(b)and Rule10b-5 when he
misappropriatesconfidentialinformation forsecurities trading purposes, in
breach of a duty owed to the source of the inform ation.). 
118 Dirks, 463 U.S. at660 (emphasisadded).
119 Id. at647.
120 Id. at662.
121 Id. at657.
122 Id. at658 (internalquotationsomitted).
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on the factsofthe case, itwasclearthatthe inform ation con-
cerning the fraud derived not primarily from Dirkss independent 
diligence, butratherfrom theaccess offered by the tippers posi-
tion asform eremployee ofthe issuer.123 While the majority of
the Supreme Court, writing in the pre-Internet age, believed
that such inform ation cannot be made simultaneously available 
to all of the corporations stockholders or the public generally,124
technologicaladvancessince that1983 decision have done just
that(e.g., EDGAR, corporate websites, etc.).125 Indeed, Regula-
tion FD (adoptedin 2000)now even requiresit.126
The difference between equal information and equal access 
isthattheformerisneitherrequired byfairnessnortenable,127
while the latter rewards investm entin theproduction ofinfor-
mation in m arketsand alsoprotectsstructurally disadvantaged
parties in securities transactions.128 Requiring equality ofac-
cess to corporate inform ation ordisclosure priorto trading in-
centivizes the production ofinform ation because itwould give
free rein to certain kinds of inform ational advantages that re-
sult in differences in diligence and acum en.129 Yet, it safe-
guards the structurally disadvantaged by limiting opportunities 
forprofitfrom manipulation ofconfidentialconnectionsorresort
to stealth.130
123 Id. at660.
124 Id. at659.
125 See, e.g., SEC, EDGAR:COMPANY FILINGS, https:/www.sec.gov/edgar/search
edgar/companysearch.html[https://perma.cc/P34K-FUFK].
126 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2011) (Whenever an issuer, or person acting 
onitsbehalf, disclosesanymaterialnonpublicinformationregardingthatissuer
oritssecuritiestoany[broker-dealer, investmentadvisor, institutionalman-
agementadvisor, investmentcompany, orshareholderundercircumstancesin
which itisreasonably foreseeable thatthe shareholderwillbuy orsellthe
issuers securities] .... the issuer shall m ake publicdisclosure ofthatinfor-
mation .... (1)[s]imultaneously, in thecaseofan intentionaldisclosure;and
(2) [p]romptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.). 
127 Scheppele, supra note 36, at 125 (Fairness does not require equality to 
extend so far as to require inform ational sym metry.). 
128 Id. at125.
129 Chiarellav. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 252 n.2 (1980)(Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
130 Id.
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Even supportersoflegalized insidertrading havenoted that
insider traders often obtain this secret inform ation through 
the good old boy network.131 Butm ostAmericansarenotcur-
rentorform erseniorcorporate officialswith accessto advance
information on price-movingmatterssuch asearnings, dividends,
mergers, orundisclosedfraudslikethetippinginsidersin Cady,
Roberts and Dirks.132 MostAm ericans are notanalystsable to
command meetings with corporate insiders like the tippee in
Dirks.133 MostAmericansdonotsocializewithcorporateinsiders
who are capable ofproviding meaningfultipslike the two ana-
lystsin Newman, oneofwhom knew an individualin theinves-
torrelationsdepartm entatDellfrom businessschool, and the
otherofwhom wastipped aboutNVIDIAs earnings because he 
knew an individualin the finance departm entfrom church.134
MostAmericansdonothaveaclosefamilyrelativethatworksas
an investmentbanker, asin the Salman case. MostAmericans
donoteven work in positionsthatwould grantaccesstoinsider
information without tipping, like the white-collar lawyer in
OHagan who noticed his partners working to facilitate Grand
Mets acquisition of Pillsbury before he bought options in the 
lattercom pany,135 or even the m ark-up man in Chiarella who
workednightlywith confidentialdealbooks.136
Becauseoftheseissuesofstructuralaccess, such unfairness
would notberemedied by sim ply allowingeveryonetotradeon
thenonpublicinformationin their possession. Forwhilesucharule
couldconceivablybefairwith respecttothosewhosepositionsof
accessallow them tobein theknow atleastsomeofthetim e, it
wouldnotprovideequalityofopportunitytomostretailinvestors.
Forthesereasons, ifwewerein theOriginalPosition decid-
ingexanteon rulestogovern thesecuritiesindustry, wewould
probably decide that fairness does not require perfect equality 
131 McGee, supra note28, at212 (internalquotationsomitted).
132 See Cady, Roberts& Co., Exchange ActRelease No. 34-6668, 40 SEC
Docket 907, 90809 (1961); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 64849 (1983). 
133 Dirks, 463 U.S. 646, 64849 (1983). 
134 UnitedStatesv. Newman, 773 F.3d438, 443, 452 (2014).
135 United States v. OHagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997). 
136 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980)(internalquota-
tionsomitted).
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ofinform ation, m oney, skill, sophistication, or luck. Itm erely
requiresan equalabilitytoobtain meaningfulinvestm entinfor-
mation through independentand otherwiselawfuldiligence. That
is, fairnessunderthe socialcontractrequiresequality of access
toinformation.
2. Insider Trading Constitutes Cheating 
Concom itantwith theneed todefine fairness in the securi-
tiesm arkets, itisalsocriticalattheoutsetofanyefforttolegis-
late against certain forms ofimpermissible trading to define
precisely what cheating m eans. 
However tempting it may be to fall back upon Justice Stewarts 
fam ous statem ent on obscenity I know it when I see it137
both businessandsocietyasawholedeservemoreprecision. Yet
the concept of cheating, despite its apparent importance in our 
everydaylives, hasbeen mostlyignored in theliteratureofmoral
philosophy.138 Although theconceptofinsidertradingisarecur-
ringtopicin thelegalliterature, seldom isitidentifiedoranalyzed
asa modeofcheating asopposed toa form oflying orstealing.
Forexam ple, in accordancewith thetheoreticalfocusofcurrent
law on fiduciarydutyand misappropriation, ProfessorOstasde-
scribes insider trading as a crime that combine[s] the sin of theft 
with the sins of betrayal and deceit.139 Even Blacks Law Dic-
tionaryconflatescheatingwithlyingandstealing(fraud), asitde-
fines cheating as the fraudulent obtaining of anothers property 
by means of a false symbol or token or by other illegal practices.140
But as anyone who has ever administered or taken an exam
knows, cheating does notnecessarily require lying or stealing
anothers information. Cheating can also occur when the right 
answersare given to the test-taker, orwhen the test-takerse-
cretly views the answer key on the professors desk. 
Itis, in part, thefailuretoadequately define cheating or 
consistentlyrecognizinginsidertradingasagraveform ofcheating
137 Jacobellisv. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)(Stewart, J., concurring).
138 STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING:A MORAL THEORY
OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME 54(2007).
139 Ostas, supra note36, at582.
140 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 287 (10thed. 2014).
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independent of fiduciary breach or m isappropriation141 that 
hasresulted in thedism alstateofU.S. insidertradinglaw and
theprevalenceofthisdestructivepractice.
In hisbook Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of
White Collar Crime, RutgersLaw ProfessorStuartGreen offers
that, in order for us to say thatX hascheated, X must(1)vio-
latea fairand fairly enforced rule, (2)with theintenttoobtain
an advantage overa party with whom she is in a cooperative,
rule-bound relationship.142
Astothefirstrequirem ent, Green explainswith considerable
reference to the pioneering work ofH.L.A. Hart, Dworkin, and
Rawlsthatcheating, insofarasitobtainsm oralcondem nation,
generallyinvolvestheviolationofam andatory, proscriptiverule
thatregulatesconductinaparticularendeavor.143 However, Green
rightlydoesnotindicatethatsuch arulemustbecodifiedin order
foritsviolation to constitute cheating because codification isa
necessaryfunction oflaw, notmorality.144 The function of Greens 
firstrequirementissimply toindicatethattheremustbesom e
degreeofrulespecificitybeforeones violation of such a rule can 
141 Although itisnotexpresslyrecognized ascheating, onenotableexcep-
tion to the generalrule thatinsider trading is notpunishable unless itis
accompanied byfiduciarybreach ormisappropriation isSEC Rule14e-3, which
prohibitstradingon thebasisofmaterialnonpublicinformation concerninga
tenderofferthat:
[thetrader]knowsorhasreasontoknow isnonpublicandwhich
heknowsorhasreason toknow hasbeen acquired directlyor
indirectlyfrom:
(1)Theofferingperson,
(2)Theissuerofthesecuritiessoughtortobesoughtbysuch
tenderoffer, or
(3)Anyofficer, director, partneroremployeeoranyotherperson
actingonbehalfoftheofferingpersonorsuchissuer, topurchase
orsellorcausetobepurchased orsold anyofsuch securities
oranysecuritiesconvertibleintoorexchangeableforanysuch
securitiesoranyoption orrighttoobtain ortodisposeofany
oftheforegoingsecurities, unlesswithin areasonabletimeprior
toanypurchaseorsalesuchinformationanditssourcearepub-
liclydisclosedbypressreleaseorotherwise.
17 C.F.R. §240.14e-3 (2016).
142 GREEN, supra note138, at57.
143 Id. at 5862. 
144 See id. at75.
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be deemed cheating.145 Thus, itwould seem thatonly ifweare
willingtoacceptthattherearenomandatory proscriptiverules
governingappropriatebehaviorin themarketscan themoniker
ofcheating, in themoralsense, benecessarilyinapplicableorab-
sentfrom ourinsidertradinglexicon.
OnlythemostcallousGordon Gekkos146 amongstus, however,
would claim today that anything goes in the securities markets. 
Thisauthorisaware ofno issuer, financialinstitution, orfund
thatm akesthisclaim. Thus, certain rulesdoexistin thesecuri-
ties markets both express and implied and their violation can, 
under certain circum stances, be condemned as cheating. This
Article would submit that the rule violated by insider trading 
is the im plied rule that thou shaltnottradein securitieson the
basisofinformation concerning thatissuerunlesssuch informa-
tion could alsobeavailabletoothersthrough theirindependent
and otherwise lawful diligence. 
Greens second condition for cheating that it is a rule viola-
tion with the intent to obtain an advantage over a party with
whom she is in a cooperative rule-bound relationship147isalso
met by insider trading. Green explains that although all instances 
ofcheating involverule-breaking, therearem any casesofrule-
breaking that do not involve cheating.148 Hethusoffersfourad-
ditionalconditionsnecessarytoturn rule-breakingintoimmoral
cheating: (1) the rule broken must be fair and enforced in an even-
handedmannerand notsubjecttoa justified exception; (2) the 
rule-breaking must be intentional; (3) the rule-breaker must be 
partofacooperativerule-governed activitythatinvolvesanother
party; and (4) the rule-breaker m ustintend togain an advan-
tage through her rule-breaking.149
Thefirsttworequirementsaremeanttoindicatethat, tocon-
stitutecheatingdeservingofmoralcondemnation (ifnotalsolegal
prohibition), theviolationofarulemustbeunjustifiedandnotacci-
dental.150 Tothoseversed in criminallaw, thesetworequirements
145 Id. at 6162. 
146 WALL STREET (20thCenturyFox1987).
147 GREEN, supra note138, at57 (emphasisadded).
148 Id. at63.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 6364. 
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arefamiliarand easily understood, forthey arereflected in the
requirements ofmens rea (crim inalintent)151 and in the avail-
abilityofaffirmativedefenses.152
The third requirement, however, is worthy ofsubstantially
more explanation. Are securities traders part ofa cooperative
rule-governed activity that involves another party153 such that
theymaybecapableofcheating?Certain peoplemaybetempted,
atfirstglance, todenythatthere is any cooperative activity in 
thesecuritiesmarketsbecausethereareundoubtedly zero-sum
aspectsto trading. In m any securitiestransactions, there must
be a buyer and seller: a winner (who underpays, sells above fair 
marketvalue, orplacesthecorrectbetastothefuturevalueof
the security) and a loser (who overpays, sells below fair market 
value, orplacesthewrongbetastothefuturevalueofthesecu-
rity). However, thiswould bea fundam entalm isunderstanding
of both Greens requirement of cooperativeactivityandthesecu-
ritiesmarketsthem selves. Therequirem entofcooperativeactiv-
ity does notm ean thatthe parties mustcooperate, butrather
that they are engaged in a mutually beneficial cooperative en-
terprise, such as a game, a market or a political contest.154 Without
a counterparty to purchase whatisbeing sold orsellwhatone
wishestopurchase, therecan benosecuritiesm arket. Withouta
securities market, there can be scantcapitalaccum ulation for
peopleorenterprises. Thus, allissuersand tradersareinvolved
in a mutually beneficialendeavortoraisecapital, grow wealth,
anddevelopeconomies.
Thefourth requirem entisperhapsthesine qua non ofcheat-
ing: the rule breaker must intendtogain an advantagethrough
her rule-breaking.155 We have already established that fair-
ness in the context of the securitiesmarkets, undertheprinciple
ofequalityofopportunity, requiresequalityofaccesstom aterial
information.156 It thus follows that unfairness means inequality 
151 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 113435 (10th ed. 2014); see also id. at 93031. 
152 Id.
153 GREEN, supra note138, at63.
154 Id. at64.
155 Id. at63.
156 Scheppele, supra note36, at125.
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of access to information. And gaining an unfair advantage means 
exploiting thisinequality ofaccessto inform ation. Indeed, this
was the SECs original recognition in Cady, Roberts back in 1961,
when itexplained thata duty to disclose or abstain oughtto
ariseasafunction oftwofactors: the existence of a relationship 
giving access, directly orindirectly, to information intended to
beavailableonlyfora corporatepurposeand notforthepersonal
benefit of anyone, and the inherent unfairness involved where a
party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavail-
able to those with whom he is dealing.157
Forthesereasons, tradingon thebasisofinform ation thatis
nottheoretically accessible to others through independentdili-
genceconstitutescheatingin violation ofourbasicsocialcontract
applicabletobusiness. Anditshouldberecognizedassuch, irre-
spectiveofwhetheritisaccompaniedwithlyingorviolatingaconfi-
dence(thebreachoffiduciaryduty)orstealing(misappropriation).
B. Insider Trading Violates the Categorical Imperative
Tradingon thebasisofinform ation known tobeinaccessible
toothersthrough diligenceisalsowrong becauseitviolatesde-
ontologicaldutiesofmorality. ImmanuelKantexplainedthatthe
morality ofan actdependsupon the intentofitsauthorto ad-
here, as a matter of duty, to the categorical imperative.158 Under
hisfirstformulation, known astheFormulaoftheUniversalLaw,
Kant explains that one must act only on that m axim  whereby 
you can atthesam etimewillthatitshould becom ea universal
law.159 In hissecond formulation, the Formula ofHumanity, he
defines the imperative as [s]o act that you treat hum anity,
whetherin yourown person orin theperson ofanyother, always
at the same tim e as an end, never m erely as a means.160 Since
thesetwoformulationseffectivelyboildown tothesamething,161
the question concerning the morality ofinsidertrading becomes:
wouldwewanttheprincipleofcheatingtobecomesomethingthat
157 See Cady, Roberts& Co., Exchange ActRelease No. 34-6668, 40 SEC
Docket907, 912 (1961)(emphasisadded).
158 SANDEL, supra note94, at122.
159 Id. at120.
160 Id. at122.
161 Id. at120.
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everyone should doallthe time, oraretraderswho exploitinfor-
mation theyknow tobestructurallyinaccessibletootherssimply
put[ting] [their] interests and special circum stances ahead of 
everyone elses?162 The answerappearsclearundereitherfor-
m ulation:itviolatesthecategoricalim perative.
1. Insider Trading Violates the Formula of Universal Law
InsidertradingviolatestheFormulaofUniversalLaw because
traders operate in a marketsystem thatdepends on the exis-
tenceofsom ebody willing tobuy whatthey areselling and sell
whatthey are buying. Ifeveryone were to use their own non-
publicly available information, and could be expected to do so,
then themarketfortradingwould likelyceasetofunction effec-
tively. Much like Kants famous explanation of why ram pant 
promise-breakingwould destroythereliabilityand valueofprom-
isesaltogether,163 thisArticlearguesthatifeveryonetraded on
theirownprivatelyaccessibleinformation, themarketsthemselves
wouldceasetofunction effectively, asfew peoplewouldwillingly
purchase stocks.164 Why relinquish yourmoney ifthe oddsare
that your counterparty knows something that you dont and 
cant know, and that your investmentwillprom ptlydevalue?
Ram pant insider trading would undermine trust, deter in-
vesting, and potentially destroy theability toaccumulatecapital.
Indeed, even staunch defendersofcertain formsofinsidertrad-
ing notethatthereissomeevidenceofthisoccurring insofaras
liquidityproviders, whoanticipatesomedegreeofinsidertrading,
adjusttheirbid-ask spread in orderto self-insure and thereby
pass along an insider trading tax upon all other investors.165 If
162 Id. at121.
163 Onora ONeill, A Simplified Account of Kants Ethics, in MATTERS OF LIFE
AND DEATH, (Tom Regan ed., 1986), reprinted in MORALITY AND MORAL CON-
TROVERSIES 48 (JohnArthur5thed., 1999).
164 Cf. United States v. OHagan, 521 U.S. 658 (1997) (Although informa-
tionaldisparityisinevitablein thesecuritiesm arkets, investorslikelywould
hesitate to venture their capitalin a m arketwhere trading based on mis-
appropriated nonpublic inform ation is unchecked by law.). 
165 HenryG. Manne, Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog that Did Not Bark,
31 IOWA J. CORP. L. 167, 168 (Fall 2005) (finding feasible merit in the adverse 
selection argum ent against insider trading, which holds that because m arket 
makerssystematically losemoney when insidersaretrading, they willexpand
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the practice ofinsider trading were to becom e universal, this
liquidityproblem likelywouldonlyintensify.
2. Insider Trading Treats Counterparties As Mere Means to
an End
InsidertradingalsoviolatestheForm ulaofHum anity, which
comm andsthatwenevertreatpeopleasmeremeanstoan end,
butratheralwaysasinherently valuableendsin themselves.166
Tounderstandwhyitdoesso, itiscriticaltounderstandwhatis
m eantby treating people as m ere m eans. Cam bridge philoso-
pher Baroness Onora ONeil, has aptly explained that there is a 
difference between occasionally using people as means for ex-
am ple, usinga tellertocash our checks at the bank and using 
them as mere means, or as a prop to be manipulated.167 The
difference lies in respecting the others ability to consent to our 
treatment, atleastin principle.168 We deny anothers ability to 
provide such consent when we deceive them, coerce them , or
otherwise failto providethem with theinform ation thatwould
providethem , asrationalbeingsdeservingofrespect, theability
to m ake their own fully informed judgments.169 In the case of
securities transactions that depend upon counterparties being
unawarethatwepossessinform ation thattheycould neverpos-
sessthrough theirindependentdiligence, wedeny them theop-
portunitytomakesuch choiceson theirown.
In sum , becausethevalueofinsidertrading dependson the
insider traders ability to obtain exceptions to the rules they expect 
othersgenerallytofollow, and necessarilyrequiresthetraderto
deny others the opportunity to make fully informed choices as
rationalhum ans, itviolatesdeontologicaldutiesofjustice.
C. Insider Trading Undermines Social Utility
ThisSection shallarguethatinsidertradingisunethicalbe-
cause itunderm inessocialutility by bringing more harm than
theirbid-ask spread in ordertocoverthegreatercostofdoingbusiness, and
thereby pass along the cost of insiders trading to all outside investors). 
166 SANDEL, supra note94, at122.
167 ONeill, supra note163, at48.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 4849. 
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good. Thevastm ajority oftheargumentsconcerning theethics
of insider trading are consequentialist along these lines
perhaps, in part, tospeak thelanguageofeconom istslikeHenry
Manneand adherentsofthelaw and econom icsmovem entwho
have engaged heavily in this debate and tend to dism iss fair-
ness argum ents as puerile.170 Sincetheacademy hasalready
long debated the ethics ofinsider trading on these lines, this
Section shallonly briefly recap the m ajorargumentsbefore of-
fering m y contribution:based on new empiricalevidence from
recentfinanceand accounting literature, insidertrading harms
the econom y by undermining trust, which deters retailinvest-
m entand correlateswith increasesin thecostofequity capital
anddecreasesin liquidity.
1. The Alleged Benefits of Insider Trading and the Harms
of Prohibition
Proponentsofinsidertradingarguethatitprovidesanumber
ofbenefits. In his fam ous 1966 book, Insider Trading and the
Stock Market, Mannearguedthatinsidertradingservedasarel-
atively low-costform ofcorporate compensation fortheinsider-
entrepreneurforcreating the valuable inform ation in the first
place.171 This argument, which he has subsequently all but
abandoned,172 wasshown tobefallaciousbecausesuch aregime
would allow many individuals to reap compensation they have 
notearned and potentiallyeven profitoffinform ation thatactu-
allyharm sthecompany.173
Manne also argued that insider trading contribute[s] im-
portantlytotheefficiencyofstock market pricing, insofar as the 
increasedflow ofinformationoccasionedbyinsidertradingallows
the price ofstocks to better reflecttheir true value.174 McGee
170 Manne, supra note165, at182 n.60;see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 251
(1991)(dismissingfairnessargumentaslackingcontent).
171 MANNE, supra note 93, at 13145. 
172 Id. at 171 (noting that the argument is perhaps less robust than I and 
other proponents had originally assum ed). 
173 RobertA. Prentice& Dain C. Donelson, Insider Trading as a Signaling
Device, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 46 (Spring 2010). 
174 Manne, supra note 165, at 16785. 
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sim ilarlyarguesthatinsider tradingservesasam eansofcom -
municating market inform ation, which m akes m arkets more
efficient because it acts as a signal to others that a stocks price 
will likely move in a certain direction.175 Itthushasbeen con-
tended that restricting insider trading may have long-term
adverse effects on the economy as it decreases market efficiency 
by arguably stifling inform ation flow.176 This argument, while
persuasivetoan extentiftrue(atleastinsofarasm oreaccurate
pricing benefits outsiders choosing whetherto investinitially),
hasbeen criticized aslogically inconsistent. Whileitcham pions
marketefficiency, itseeminglyignoresthefactthatm arketeffi-
ciencyalsorequiresself-restrainedcompetition, which isthwarted
by insider trading.177 In m y view, the pricing efficiency argu-
m entwould only have potentialm eritinsofaras itpertains to
trading by trueinsiders(i.e., corporate officersand directors)be-
causethosearetheonlypeoplewhosetradesm ightbeperceived
asreliablesignals. Trading by outsider-tippeeswould likely offer
nosuchsignalingbenefit.
Nearly forty yearsafterhisfirstsalvo, Manne subsequently
argued that insider trading could im prove internalcorporate
efficiencybygeneratingpriceswings, which would signaltoup-
perm anagem entthatcorporate problemsare afoot.178 Thissig-
naling argument, however, was effectively rebutted by Prentice
and Donelson, who pointed outthatitrests on faulty assump-
tions. First, itassumesthatseniormanagementneedssuch signals
generated byinsidertrades, even though seniorm anagem entis
alreadyin thebestposition toknow aboutcorporateproblems.179
Second, itassum esthatmanagem enthasthe ability to discern
m eaningfulinform ation from insider trades that m ay be too
small, anonym ous, intentionally slow-played, or otherwise
shielded by m arketnoisetobedetectableorprovideactionable
information.180
175 McGee, supra note28, at209.
176 Id. at210.
177 Werhane, supra note 36, at 84244. 
178 Manne, supra note165, at174;see also HenryG. Manne, KeynoteAd-
dressatthe InsiderTrading Symposium (Jan. 27, 2007), in 4 J.L. ECON. &
POLY 225 (2008).
179 Prentice& Donelson, supra note 173, at 1822. 
180 Id.
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Yale ProfessorJonathan Macey also advanced an argum ent
aboutthebeneficialsignalingeffectsofinsidertrading, although
under m ore limited circum stances involving whistleblowing.181
Macey argued, as som e before him sim ilarly suggested,182 that
[p]erm itting insider trading on the basisof[information about
ongoing corporate m isconduct]would ... provide the strongest
incentivesforpeopletoseekoutandexposesuch corporatewrong-
doing.183 Whileinteresting, thisargum entwasalsorebutted by
PrenticeandDonelson, whonotethatinsidertradingoccasioned
byundisclosed newsofcorporatefraud would send onlya vague
signalto the markets unless itwas coupled with explanatory
disclosures, which would immediately destroy the value of the 
secretinformation, and thuspromptwould-bewhistleblowersto
delayorforegodisclosurealtogether.184
In the context of takeovers, McGee argues that [t]he potential 
acquirerin a takeoverattemptm ayalsobenefitbyinsidertrad-
ing because if arbitrageurs acquire shares in advance on the basis 
ofatipofthependingacquisition, theypresumablyintendtosub-
sequentlytenderthem, therebyincreasing thelikelihood thatthe
takeover willsucceed.185 He adds that insider trading regula-
tions(liketheWilliamsAct)thatrequirewould-betender-offerors
toannouncetheirintentionswellin advanceactually harm the
shareholdersofthetargetissuerbecausetheymakeiteasierfor
managementtoadoptdefensivetacticstothwartthetakeover.186
These arguments, however, are based on the assumption that
181 Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical
Analysis of Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899,
1899, 1903, 1920 (2007).
182 See, e.g., GeoffreyC. Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for
Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 BYU L.
REV. 91, 15153 (2007) (arguing for an exception to insider trading laws for 
insiders blowing the whistle on corporate fraud); Michael Abram owicz, The
Law-and-Markets Movement, 49 AM. U.L. REV. 327, 36061 (1999) (indicating 
thatinsidertradingcouldfosterthereleaseofinformationrelatedtomasstorts);
Bruce H. Kobayashi& Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an Incentive
Device, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 67 (2006) (arguing for allowing a current or past 
employee ... who is not technically an insider for insider trading purposes to trade 
onthebasisofnonpublicinformationtofacilitatetheexposureoffraud).
183 Macey, supra note181, at1939.
184 Prentice& Donelson, supra note173, at52.
185 McGee, supra note28, at209.
186 Id. at210.
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takeovers are always good an assum ption he fails to support
and that appears belied in m any circum stances by the anti-
com petitiveconsequencesthatsuch consolidationsmaybring.187
In thatsame takeovercontext, and underthe premise that
insider trading has a tendency to increase the stocks price, 
som e have argued that such price increases will benefit (1) the 
shareholderswho sellatthe tim e the [tipped]arbitrageursare
buying whom they speculate would probably have sold anyway; 
(2)theshareholderswhodonotsell, sincethepriceoftheirshares
willhaveincreased;and(3)thetargetcorporation itself.188 They
also argue thatinsider trading by intentionally tipped traders
might even benefit the acquiring corporation, to the extentit
serves as indirect compensation for various services rendered.189
These argum ents, too, seem flawed. First, the assumption that
existingshareholderswouldhavesoldanywayisuselesslyspecu-
lative. Second, asPrenticeand Donelson havenoted, inside infor-
mation certainly can be negative information that harm s the
value ofthe issuer,190 such asthe inform ation aboutcorporate
fraudin Dirks.191
Som e proponents oflegalized trading on nonpublic infor-
m ation also argue thatifinsidertrading were banned, various
harmsmay ensue. First, intentionaltippersand tippeeswould
allegedlybeharmedbecausecorporateinform ation isaproperty
right, which should bedisposableatwill, eitherforprofitorfor
free.192 Second, forcingtheanalysttogivethisinformation tothe
worldwouldeliminatetheincentivetoobtain it, harm themarket
by reducing availableinform ation, and beunjusttotheanalyst
becauseotherswouldbefreeridingon hisefforts.193 Theseargu-
mentsarealsosuspectbecausetheinsideinformation allegedly
187 See FTC, STATEMENT ON MERGER REVIEW, https://www.ftc.gov/enforce
ment/merger-review [https://perma.cc/MYQ9-ZX73](explainingthatthepurpose
ofFTC mergerreview underHart-Scott-RodinoandtheClaytonActaredirected
at preventing mergers and acquisitions that are likely to reduce competition and 
lead to higher prices, lower quality goods or services, or less innovation.). 
188 McGee, supra note28, at209.
189 Id. at 20910. 
190 Prentice& Donelson, supra note173, at5.
191 Id. at 2324. 
192 McGee, supra note28, at212.
193 Id.
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being tipped outbelongsnottotheinsider-tipper, butratherto
hiscorporationandall ofitsshareholders.194
Finally, asalastrefuge, som ehavearguedthatinsidertrad-
ing regulationsare problem aticbecausethey increase taxpayer
costs by requiring publiccom pliance m onitors like the SEC.195
Such an argumentcould only hold water, however, ifindeed it
does not result in any harm  to any identifiable group196 orif
the costs ofregulation were notoutweighed by the benefits of
prohibition and the harm sassociated with insidertrading. The
nextSection shallnow turn tothosequestions.
2. The Ostensible Harms of Insider Trading
Opponents ofinsidertrading focus on the harms caused by
insidertrading. Historically, theseargumentshavefocusedlargely
on shareholderswhosevalueisstolen byinsidertradersandthe
harm sdonetothesanctityoffiduciaryrelationships, likethatof
adirectortohiscorporation oran employeetohisemployer, when
confidentialcorporateinformation ismisappropriated fortheper-
sonalbenefitofa directororemployee.197 Thegraduallegalrec-
ognition oftheseharmshasgiven risetothebodyofU.S. insider
trading law.198 They appear to be the main reasons that practi-
cally allthe articlesthathavebeen written on insidertrading in
recent years have treated it as something evil199 and whyinsider
194 Id. at210.
195 Id.
196 Id. at208.
197 See, e.g., RobertS. Rubin and MyerFeldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon
Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95(4)U. PA. L. REV. 468,
469, 47172 (1947) (noting that early com mon law did not adequately reach 
the subtleties ofharm in connection with manipulation on the impersonal
securities markets and recognizing that a guiding light of the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act was to curb abuses by insiders who normally have access to 
confidentialinformation notavailable to smallstockholdersand to the gen-
eral public). 
198 See infra Part II.C.2.ad (explaining the gradual evolution of insider 
tradingcaselaw toprotectthrough disclosurerequirements(1)existing share-
holdersfrom tradeswith a non-disclosingholderofmaterialnonpublicinfor-
mation underspecialcircumstances;(2)allexisting shareholdersregardless
ofspecialcircum stances;(3)soon-to-beshareholdersbuying stock from non-
disclosing insiders;and ultimately (4)issuers and employers through the
misappropriationtheory).
199 McGee, supra note28, at217.
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trading currently com mands a strong sense of moral disap-
proval.200 However, assetforth below, theharm sarising from
insidertrading go farbeyond these harmsto shareholdersand
em ployers.201 Now, insidertradingisalsoassociatedwith empir-
icallydem onstrableharm tocapitalmarketsthemselves.202
a. Harms to Selling Shareholders
Itshould be noted attheoutsetofany discussion regarding
harmscaused by trading on thebasisofm aterialnonpublicin-
formation thatsuch insidertradingwasnotalwaysperceivedas
wrongfulin the United States, atleastinsofar as the practice
did notinvolvepublicofficials.203 Up untiltheearly partofthe
twentieth century, stateswerespliton thequestion ofwhether
itwasappropriateforcorporateinsiderstousematerialnonpublic
information toobtain a trading advantage in the market even 
over ones own shareholders.204 Although outrightfraudthrough
affirmative factualmisrepresentation was generally prohibited
underthecommon law ofcontractsofallstates,205 them ajority
ofstatesheldthattherewasnoobligation on thepartofacorpo-
rate insiderwhen buying shares from existing shareholders to
proactively disclose inform ation known only to him .206 Rather,
theability tocapitalizeon corporateinsideinformation through
silencewhiletradingwas deem ed by many to be a norm al em ol-
um ent of corporate office.207
200 Ostas, supra note36, at582.
201 See Cady, Roberts& Co., Exchange ActRelease No. 34-6668, 40 SEC
Docket 907, 913 (1961) (holding that 10b-510b5 is also applicable to a de-
frauded buyer). 
202 Prentice& Donelson, supra note173, at28.
203 Thefirstknown caseofinsidertradingin theUnitedStatestracesback
to 1792, when William Duerwasconvicted ofusing knowledge obtained by
virtue ofhis position as Assistant Secretary ofthe Treasury to guide his
speculation in federalbonds. See SteveFraser, The Genealogy of Wall Street
Crime, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/30/opin
ion/oe-fraser30 [https://perma.cc/6USD-9R57].
204 MANNE, supra note93, at18.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Cady, Roberts& Co., ExchangeActReleaseNo. 34-6668, 40 SEC Docket
907, 912 n.15 (1961); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 n.9 ([B]y 
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Onlyasm allm inorityofstatespriorto1909 hadestablished
a differentrule, by courtdecision or Blue Sky statute, which
created a fiduciary relationship between corporateinsidersand
selling shareholders, and required fulldisclosureofallrelevant
facts.208 Since that time, however, the ostensible harms from
insidertradinghavereceivedgraduallegalrecognition.
Them ainargum entofferedbyopponentsofinsidertradingis
thatitharms existing shareholders who selltheir stock to an
insidetraderbecausesuch sellerslosethevaluetheywould have
received had they notsold, oratleastnotsold atthe price at
which they sold, to an insider who possesses inform ation that
indicatesthesharesareworth more.209 Thistypeofharm gave
risetothefirstUnitedStatesSupremeCourtcasetoaddressinsider
trading:Strong v. Repide.210 In Strong, theCourtheld thata cor-
porateinsiderwith knowledgeofan im pendingsaleofcorporate
landassetstotheU.S. governmentthatwouldaffectthepriceof
the corporate landowners securities was barred from effectuat-
ingan in-person stockpurchasefrom aminorityshareholderwhere
hehad concealed thefactoftheland saleand used an interm e-
diary to keep his identity secret.211 Withoutsquarely deciding
whethercorporateinsidersnecessarilyhad adutytodiscloseall
materialfacts, theCourtbased itsdecision tobarthesaleupon
the so-called special facts rule.212 Underthatdoctrine, itwas
legally noteworthy that the defendant-insider was not only a
director, butalsothat(1)heownedthree-fourthsofthesharesof
itsstock;(2)hewasactingaschiefnegotiatorregardingthecor-
porate assetsale with the governm enton behalfofthe other
shareholders and therefore was privy to the probability ofthe
sale;and (3)thatthe sale wasforthe whole ofthe property of
the[1934]ExchangeAct[, Congressintended]toeliminatetheidea thatthe
useofinsideinformation forpersonaladvantagewasanormalemolumentof
corporate office.). 
208 MANNE, supra note 93, at 1819. 
209 See generally BasicInc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224(1987).
210 See generally 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
211 Id. at434.
212 Id. at431;see also MANNE, supra note93, at21 (AfterStrong, the special 
facts doctrine becam e the prevailing approach in the states at least insofar 
assecuritiestransactionswere conducted in person, ratherthan anonymously
overanexchange, asmostaretoday.).
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the com pany its only valuable asset.213 Accordingly, underthe
special facts of that case, the court held there was a legal obliga-
tiononthepartofthedefendant to m ake these disclosures.214
Harm sto selling shareholdersinvolving no affirm ative m is-
representation (only silence)because they were conducted over
an anonym ousexchange only becam e truly recognized in 1961,
when theSEC decidedCady, Roberts, holding that [i]t would be 
anomalousindeed iftheprotection afforded by theantifraud pro-
visionswerewithdrawn from transactionseffectedon exchanges,
primary markets for securities transactions.215 Untilthattim e,
statecourtsliketheMassachusettsSuprem eCourtin Goodwin
v. Agassiz (in 1933) often regrettably reasoned: Law in its sanc-
tions is notcoextensive with morality. Itcannotundertake to
putallpartiestoeverycontracton an equalityastoknowledge,
experience, skill, and shrewdness.216
By thetim eoftheCady, Roberts decision in 1961, ofcourse,
the 1933 SecuritiesActand 1934 SecuritiesExchange Acthad
213 Strong, 213 U.S. at 43132. 
214 Id. at434.
215 Cady, Roberts involvedthequestion ofwhetherasellingbrokerandhis
firm committed fraud by trading on the basis ofnot-yet-publicinformation
that Curtis WrightCorporation would soon reduce its quarterly dividend,
which hadbeen tippedtothem byan associateofthebrokeragefirm whowas
alsoadirectorofthatissuer. Findingthatcognizableharm hadbeen commit-
ted by thetrader, notwithstanding thelack ofany affirmativefalsestatement,
SEC Chairman and formerColumbiaLaw ProfessorWilliam Caryalsonoted
that silence m ay also constitute fraud in cases of corporate insiders, partic-
ularly officers, directors or controlling stockholders because such individuals 
m ust disclose m aterial facts which are known to them  by virtue of their posi-
tion butwhich arenotknown topersonswith whom theydeal, and which, if
known, would affecttheirinvestm ent judgm ent .... or, abstain from  trading. 
Heexplainedthat
the obligation [to disclose orabstain]rests on two principal
elements;first, the existence ofa relationship giving access,
directly orindirectly, toinformation intended tobeavailable
onlyfora corporatepurposeand notforthepersonalbenefitof
anyone, andsecond, theinherentunfairnessinvolvedwherea
party takesadvantage ofsuch information knowing itisun-
availabletothosewithwhom heisdealing.
Cady, Roberts& Co., ExchangeActReleaseNo. 34-6668, 40 SEC Docket907,
91213 (1961). 
216 Goodwinv. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933).
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been enacteduponarecognition that a staggering portion of the 
securitiesissued in the bubble econom y ofthe 1920shad been
tainted with fraud.217 A significant purpose of the Exchange 
Actwastoeliminatetheidea thattheuseofinsideinformation
for personaladvantage was a normalemolumentofcorporate
office.218 TheSEC hadalso, bythen, prom ulgatedRule10b-5 in
1942,219 even though when theSEC adoptedit, itapparentlydid
notconsideritspossibleapplication toinsidertrading.220
Whilesomedism isstheharm stotheseselling shareholders,
assum ing they would have sold anyway and arguably received 
a betterprice than they would have had inside-traderdem and
notexisted,221 even Henry Manne appears to have recognized
thetremendousassumption im beddedhere, andthussim plyhas
argued of late that thepracticeofinsidertrading[does]nosig-
nificantharm tolong-term investors.222
b. Harms to Buyers
Insidertrading also ostensibly harm speople who buy stock
from insiders. Themain problem hereisthatthesepeoplemay
be buying junk from an insiderwith thesecretknowledge that
thesecurityisworth lessthan thecurrentprice, which doesnot
reflect the insiders potentially negative inform ation. This harm 
wasalsorecognizedin 1961 when theSEC in Cady, Roberts held
217 John H. Walsh, A Simple Code of Ethics: A History of the Moral Purpose
Inspiring Federal Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1015, 1042 (20002001). 
218 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at912 n.15.
219 SecuritiesExchangeActReleaseNo. 3230 (May21, 1942), 7 Fed. Reg.
3804(1942)(Rule10b-5 makesitunlawfulin connection with thepurchaseor
saleofanysecurity:
(a)Toemployanydevice, scheme, orartificetodefraud, (b)To
make any untrue statementofa m aterialfactorto omitto
stateamaterialfactnecessaryin ordertomakethestatements
made, in thelightofthecircumstancesunderwhich theywere
made, notmisleading, or(c)Toengagein anyact, practice, or
courseofbusinesswhich operatesorwouldoperateasafraud
ordeceituponanyperson....).
220 Ventoruzzo, supra note20, at4 (citing SEC v. Tex. GulfSulphur, 401
F.2d833, 885 (1968)(Moore, J., dissenting)).
221 McGee, supra note28, at208.
222 Manne, supra note165, at168 (emphasisadded).
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that Rule 10b-5 was also applicable to a defrauded buyer.223 To
find otherwise, according to the Com mission, ignores the plight 
of the buying public wholly unprotected from  the m isuse of 
special inform ation.224 The Com missioner noted that there is 
novalidreason whypersonswhopurchase stock from an officer,
director or other person having the responsibilities of an insider 
should nothave the same protection afforded by disclosure of
specialinform ationaspersonswhosell stock to them[,] adding: 
itwould beasorrydistinction toallow [an insider]tousethe
advantageofhisposition toinducethebuyerintotheposition
ofabeneficiary[owedfiduciarydutiesbycorporateinsidersto
corporate shareholders]although he was forbidden to do so
oncethebuyerhadbecomeone.225
c. Harms to Issuers
Opponentsofinsidertradingalsofocuson harm sthatitm ay
cause to issuers. The harm can take severalforms, depending
upon whethertheunderlyinginform ation isgood orbad forthe
issuer, whethertheinsiderorhertippeeisbuying orselling, or
whether the transaction involves shares in the insiders own com-
panyoranothercom pany.
On themostfundam entaland legallyrecognized level, when
an insidertradeson ortipsoutinform ation shegleaned by vir-
tue ofherposition, she m ay be personally benefitting from in-
form ation thatbelongsto the issuerand thatwasentrusted to
theinsiderforthebenefitofthe issuerand itsshareholders.226
The harm consists of misappropriation of the issuers property 
rightandthebreachofthefiduciaryrelationship.227
223 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at913.
224 Id.
225 Id. at914n.23 (emphasisinoriginal).
226 See generally Dirksv. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
227 Cf. United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19, 2728 (1987) (finding that 
theWallStreetJournalreporterwhotipped outadvancecopiesofhismarket-
moving column to certain tradersviolated the m ailand wire fraud statutes
because the pre-publication colum n was its property and involved the vio-
lation of [the] general proposition, that a person who acquires special knowl-
edgeandinformation byvirtueofaconfidentialorfiduciaryrelationshipwith
anotherisnotfreetoexploitthatknowledgeorinformation forhisown per-
sonal benefit[.]). 
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However, asthedissenting Justicesrecognized in Dirks, issuer
harm can also occur regardless ofwhether the insider-tipper
receives a personal benefit in exchange, let alone one that is ob-
jective, consequential, andrepresentsatleastapotentialgain of
a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature as is now required in 
theSecondCircuitunderNewman.228
Justices Blackm un, Brennan, and Marshallallknew that
[t]he fact that the insider himselfdoes not benefit from the
breach does not eradicate the shareholders injury and it makes 
no difference to the shareholderwhetherthe corporate insider
gained orintended togain personally from thetransaction;the
shareholder still has lost because of the insiders m isuse of non-
public inform ation.229
Toseewhythisisso, im aginethatan insideroratem porary
insider learns of his companys plans to conducta takeover of
anothercompany. Imaginefurtherthattheinsiderthenpurchases
stock in thetarget(asin OHagan), ortipstheinformation toa
hedgefundanalyst(asinNewman)orhisrelative(asinSalman),
who then purchases the targets stock. Such trading on the basis 
of this information m ay harm the insiders own issuer (the ac-
quiringcom pany)becauseitmaydriveupthepriceofthetarget
com panys shares, causing the acquiring company to pay m ore 
than theyotherwisewould havehad toin ordertocompletethe
takeover.230 This could be the case if (1) the insiders or tippees 
trade is large enough to increase the share price based on in-
creaseddemand, or(2)ifthetraderesultsin aleak oftheacquir-
ing companys intentions, which could cause selling shareholders 
of the target to become holdouts for more money.231 Accordingly,
the practice oftrading on the basis ofmaterialnonpublicinfor-
mationregardingatenderofferhaslongbeenbanned.232
228 Dirks, 463 U.S. at646 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 67677 (recognizing that [t]he im proper-purpose requirem ent ... 
has no basis in law but m erely rests on the policy that the end justifie[s] the 
m eans, which is unique). 
230 Sharon R. Barstow, What Happens to Stock Prices After Acquisition?,
THE NEST, http://budgeting.thenest.com/happens-stock-prices-after-acquisition
-32684.html[https://perma.cc/T35V-TSG3].
231 GeriTerzo, Why Do Stock Prices Increase After a Takeover?, THE NEST,
http:/budgeting.thenest.com/happens-stock-prices-after-acquisition-32684.html
[https://perma.cc/K36J-J5HY].
232 See 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-3 (1990).
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In the case ofbad corporate news (e.g., Steve Jobss cancer 
forApple),233 issuersm ightalsobeharmedbytradingbeforethe
companychoosestom aketheinform ation public.234 Ifatradeon
thisnegative inform ation causesa substantive leak as to the 
reason whytheinsiderisselling(i.e., uncertaintyin seniorm an-
agem ent), itcould prompta panicked marketsell-offbeforethe
issuerhastimetoputreassuring contingency plansin place.235
Thus, as Professor Werhane has noted, insider trading harms
issuers because it does not protect the privacy of information it 
is supposed to protect.236
Finally, one otherway in which issuers m ay be harm ed by
tippingoutand/ortradingon materialnonpublicinformation con-
cerns the apparent effect of such conduct on investors trust and 
confidencein them anagem entoftheissuer.237 Considerthecase
ofRajatGupta, wholearned materialnonpublicinformation con-
cerning Goldman Sachsand Procter& Gambleby virtue ofhis
position on their boards, and then reportedly gave such then-
secretinformation tohisfriend, RajRajaratnam, a principalat
thenow-defunctGalleon hedgefund.238 When thepubliclearned
about Guptas tipping in early March 2011 from  articles entitled 
Feds Accuse P&G Director as a result of the governments de-
cision to charge Gupta with insidertrading,239 many were left
wondering what else m ight he have leaked?240 Ultim ately, the
233 Brandon Griggs, Steve Jobs, Apple founder, dies, CNN (Oct. 5, 2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/05/us/obit-steve-jobs/[https://perma.cc/8MA7-KB4A].
234 Werhane, supra note36, at844.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 SpencerDerek Klein, Insider Trading, SEC Decision-Making, and the
Calculus of Investor Confidence, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665, 66668 (1988). 
238 Indictment, United Statesv. RajatGupta, No. 11-Crim-907, (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 25, 2011) (Gupta obtained the Inside Inform ation in his capacity as a 
m em ber of the Goldm an Sachs Board and the P&G Board .[he] disclosed the 
InsideInformation toRajaratnam , with theunderstanding thatRajaratnam
would use the Inside Inform ation to purchase and sell securities.). 
239 Susan Pulliam, Feds Accuse P&G Director, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2011),
http:/www.wsj.com/artcles/SB10001424052748704506004576174420176168268
[https://perma.cc/3693-MM79].
240 John Carney, Rajat Gupta Had Inside Information on $61 Billion P&G
Deal in 2005, CNBC (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.cnbc.com/id/41852969 [https://
perma.cc/KEZ5-HLJ9].
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marketpunished Procter& Gam ble,241 effectivelyforcingGupta
toresignfrom thecom panythesam eday.242
Reinforcingthesereasonswhyinsidertradingharmsissuers,
a numberofem piricalstudieshave also concluded thatrobust
insidertrading regulations actually help issuers. Forexam ple,
University of Michigan Professor Laura Beny concluded that strin-
gentinsidertrading laws and enforcementare associated with
greater corporate valuation[,] at least in common law countries.243
Likewise, Durnevand Nain found em piricalevidenceindicating
that insider trading restrictions are on average associated with 
higher firm value.244 Thisappearstoberelated tothetendency
of insider trading to distort the incentives of controlling share-
holders in a manner detrim ental to firm value.245 Thatis, in the
absenceofinsidertradingrestrictions, controllingshareholdersmay
betem ptedbytheprospectofreceivinginsidetipsfrom manage-
ment to refrain from monitoring the firm sufficiently ....246
d. Harms to Employers
Even ifnoissuerisharmed in theprocessofinsidertrading,
itmay also harm otherstakeholders like employers who often
depend upon their em ployees discretion in order to m aintain the 
confidencesoftheirclients, lesttheylosebusiness.247
241 According totheresultsofa financialeventstudy, P&G stock experi-
encedastatisticallysignificantdeclineofapproximately2 percentin itsstock
pricerelativeto itsexpected returns(cumulativeabnormalreturn)overthe
course of the four days following the revelations of its directors involvem ent 
in insidertrading. See BruceW. Klaw & Tricia D. Olsen, Do Investors Care
About Corporate Wrongdoing? An Empirical Study Into The Materiality of
Revelations of Corporate Malfeasance (Presented toInternationalAssociation
forBusinessandSociety2014AnnualMeeting, WorkingPaper, June2014).
242 Response to Allegations Against Mr. Rajat Gupta, P&G CORP. NEWSROOM
(Mar. 1, 2011), http://news.pg.com/blog/company-strategy/response-allegations
-against-mr-rajat-gupta[https://perma.cc/83YT-LG38].
243 LauraN. Beny, Do Investors in Controlled Firms Value Insider Trading
Laws? International Evidence, 4J.L. ECON. & POLY 267, 267 (2008).
244 Durnev& Nain, supra note75, at411.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 JamesD. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to
the Chicago School, 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 628 n.1 (1986).
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In thecaseofamisappropriatingemployeewhoseekstocap-
italize offofm aterialnonpublic inform ation belonging to his
employers client, like the m ark-up man in Chiarella orthelaw-
yerin OHagan, itseems probable thatsuch an em ployee will
causehisem ployertoloseaclientorpotentiallygetsued. Indeed,
after Rajat Gupta (then m anaging director ofconsulting firm
McKinsey& Co.)waschargedwithtippingRajaratnam, themedia
justifiably questioned [w]ill Rajat Gupta [d]estroy McKinsey? 
because proxim ity to m isdeeds of this sort could be fatal for a 
company whose clients areattractedbyitsreputation forexcel-
lence and discretion ....248
e. Harms to the Capital Markets and Economy as a Whole
Finally, thisArticleshallturn toa m orerecently recognized
harm from insidertrading:theharm thatitcausestothecapital
marketsand theeconom yasa wholebyraisingthecostofcapi-
tal, deterring retailinvestm ent, and reducing liquidity. Largely
absentfrom thelegalandbusinessethicsliteratureuntilrecently,
theharmscaused by insidertradingtothecapitalmarketsand
economy asa wholehaveonly recently begun togarnertheat-
tention oflaw and ethicsscholarsthrough articleslikePrentice
and Donelsons im portant piece in the American Business Law 
Journalon Insider Trading as a Signaling Device.249 Foryears,
econom istshad dom inated thispartofthe consequentialistde-
batebyassumingthatinsidertradingactuallybenefitstheecon-
omy because itmay improve information flow and allow prices
tobetterreflectthetruevalueofstock.250
Basedon agrowingbodyofempiricalevidencein financeand
accounting literature, thisArticlejoinsPrenticeand Donelson by
submitting thattheoppositeisactually true. In essence, thefail-
ure to effectively prevent insider trading including the tendency 
ofcurrentU.S. law toallow certain form sofcheating togoun-
punishedbecausetheydonotfitneatlyintotheoriesoffiduciary
duty or misappropriation may have seriously negative economic 
248 John Carney, Will Rajat Gupta Destroy McKinsey?, CNBC (Mar. 2, 2011),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/41868799 [https://perma.cc/D4MY-K6SQ].
249 Prentice& Donelson, supra note 173, at 6871. 
250 MANNE, supra note 93, at 9899. 
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effects. Through severaldifferentmechanisms, which may com -
pound upon each other,251 insidertradingisassociated with sta-
tistically and economically significant increases in the cost of
capitalanddecreasesin m arketliquidity.252
i. Insider Trading Undermines Investor Trust and
Deters Retail Investment
First, insider trading erodes the publics confidence in the fi-
nancialand legalinstitutionsthatsupportcapitalmarkets. The
lossofinvestortrustthrough perceived cheatinghasan empiri-
cally proven and significanteffectupon retailparticipation in
thestock marketby reducing household demand forequity and
raising the return required beforem any retailinvestorschoose
to participate in a seem ingly rigged game.253 Recentem pirical
research has found unam biguousevidencethathouseholdstock
m arket participation decreases   following corporate scandals 
in the state where the household resides.254 Such participatory
declinesdonotjustaffectthewrongdoing issuer. Rather, house-
holdsdecreasetheirstock holdingsin fraudulentas well as non-
fraudulent firms.255
Misconduct perpetrated by some may thus create a negative 
externality fornon-fraudulentfirms by increasing theircostof
capital and impairing their ability to raise equity.256 Moreover,
[e]ven households that did not hold the stocks of fraudulent 
firms decrease their equity holdings.257 Thus, the decrease in 
household stock marketparticipation isnotdriven by financial
251 Bhattacharya& Daouk, supra note19, at102 (notingthattheassump-
tion thatinsidertradingenforcementaffectsthecostofequitythrough onlyone
mechanism, suchaslowered credit ratings, is a conservative assum ption). 
252 See Prentice& Donelson, supra note 173, at 6970. 
253 LuigiGuiso, PaolaSapienza& LuigiZingales, Trusting the Stock Market,
63 J. FIN. 2557, 2557 (2008).
254 Mariassunta Giannetti& Tracy Yue Wang, Corporate Scandals and
Household Stock Market Participation 2 (Eur. Corp. GovernanceInst., Working
PaperNo. 405/2014, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2331588 [https://perma.cc/9QW4-R5XM].
255 Id. (emphasisinoriginal).
256 Id. at32.
257 Id. at2.
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losses associated with the holdings in fraudulent stocks.258 Itap-
pears instead to be due to a loss of trust in the stock m arket.259
The relationship between trustand stock m arketparticipa-
tion hasbeen studiedbyacadem icsforanumberofyears. Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales have defined trust as the subjective prob-
ability individuals attribute to the possibility of being cheated,260
and they have recognized that a low level of trust can explain why 
a large fraction of individuals do not invest in the stock market.261
This is because [t]he decision to invest in stocks requires not 
only an assessm entofthe risk-return trade-offgiven the exist-
ingdata, butalsoan actoffaith (trust)thatthedatain ourpos-
session are reliable and that the overall system  is fair.262 Olisi
and Paulson have recognized that [i]nvesting in stock ... requires 
a great deal of confidence in m any institutions as [t]he investor 
mustbe convinced thatthe stockbroker willnotabscond with
herinvestm entand thatthe institutionaland legalfram ework
is sufficient to ensure that theirmoney willnoteffectively be
stolen orsquandered.263 Stock m arket participation can be dis-
couraged ... by a m istrustin the institutionsthatshould facili-
tate stock m arket participation (brokerage houses, etc.).264
Lackoftrustreducesstock marketparticipation in anum ber
ofways, including reducing expected return,265 and by increas-
ing theam ountoffundsnecessary in a nestegg beforean indi-
vidualiswillingtoriskfundsinthemarketcasino.266 Bycontrast,
258 Id.
259 Id. atAbstract.
260 Guisoetal., supra note253, at2557.
261 Id. at2558.
262 Id. at2557.
263 Una Okonkwo Osili& Anna L. Paulson, Institutional and Financial
Development: Evidence from International Migrants in the United States, 90
REV. ECON. & STAT. 498, 500 (2008).
264 Guisoetal., supra note253, at2559.
265 Id. at 256768. 
266 HansB. Christensen etal., Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regu-
lation: The Role of Implementation and Enforcement7 (Euro. Corp. Governance
Inst., WorkingPaperNo. 407/2014, 2010), https://fisher.osu.edu/blogs/efa2011
/files/CBR_2_3.pdf[https://perma.cc/6Y37-B9V7]:
Ifoutsideinvestorshavedoubtswhetherfirmswillreturn their
money, they are unlikely to provide funds in the firstplace
(leadingtolow marketliquidity)or, iftheyprovidecapitalto
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implementation of specific insider trading prohibitions on stock 
exchanges tend[s] to increase investor confidence.267
ii. Insider Trading Reduces Market Liquidity
Second, theprevalenceofinsidertradingincreasesthebid-ask
spread dem anded by liquidity providers, like financialinstitu-
tions, beforetheyarewilling topurchaseand sellequities, thus
im posing an insider trading tax on all outside investors with 
whom they deal, and reducing liquidity.268 Thisisbecause, in a
world dominated by insidertrading, liquidity providerslike fi-
nancial institutions will protect them selves by increasing their 
sell price and decreasing their buy price, which increase[s] the 
transaction cost in connection with trades, and inducesastock
tradertorequirean evenhigher return on equity.269
iii. Insider Trading Increases Firms Cost of Equity 
Third, insider trading appears to increase firms cost of equity 
by discouraging proper corporate governance and thereby in-
creasingrisk tominorityshareholders. In a world dominated by
insidertrading, minorityshareholderswouldlikelydemandhigher
returns on their equity because controlling large shareholders 
could easily be tempted by m anagementto make profits from
stock tips rather than profits from hard-to-do monitoring.270
iv. Insider Trading May Increase Cost of Debt
Fourth, ineffectivelypolicedinsidertradingiscorrelatedwith
lower country credit ratings, according to Institutional Investors 
semiannualbankersurvey.271 Although theunderlyingtheoryasto
firms, theyarelikelytodemand ahigherreturn (leadingtoa
higher cost of capital for firm s investm ents). 
267 Prentice& Donelson, supra note173, at71;see also DouglasCumming
etal., Exchange Trading Rules and Stock Market Liquidity, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 651,
652 (2011) (finding strong evidence that detailed rules that specifically recog-
nize and prohibit certain acts in the marketplace enhance investor confidence). 
268 Manne, supra note165, at168.
269 Bhattacharya& Daouk, supra note19, at76.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 10102. 
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whythisisthecasehasnotbeenwellexplained(andcausalityhas
notbeenestablished), onepossibleexplanationforthisphenomenon
isthatbecausecountrycreditratingsreflectperceptionsofexante
risk exposure,272 the perceived failure ofa country to effectively
police insider trading m ay also give the im pression thatit is
similarlyinstitutionallydeficienttotakeotherresponsibleactions,
such asrepayingitsown debts. In thisway, insidertradingmay
notonly affectthe costofcapitalin term sofissuerequity, but
alsothecostofcapitalraisedthroughdebt(e.g., bondyields).
Theeconom iceffectsoffailingtoproperlypoliceinsidertrad-
ingaresignificant. In theirhighlyinfluentialem piricalstudyon
whetherthe existence and enforcementofinsidertrading laws
affectsthe costofequity (The World Price of Insider Trading),
Bhattacharya and Daouk surveyed each ofthe 103 countries
thathad a stock exchange atthe time ofwriting to determ ine
whether they had any insider trading laws on their dom estic
books and, if so, whether such lawshad been enforced against
a violator atleastonce in actualpractice.273 Using regression
analysison fourdifferentanalyticalmodels, theyconcludedthat
m eaningful insider trading enforcement is associated with a 
significant decrease in the cost of equity up to approximately 7 
percent, and also has a positive and significant effect on coun-
try credit ratings by .3 percent, which issignificantgiven that
creditratingstendnottomovem uch.274
III. EQUALITY OF ACCESS LAWS:LESSONS FROM THE
E.U. MARKET ABUSE DIRECTIVE
Itisnotthecase, however, thathavingjustany insidertrading
law matters;275 empiricalresearch alsomakesclearthatthetype
272 Claude B. Erb etal., Country Risk and Global Equity Selection, 21 J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 74, 75 (1995) (noting that country credit risks reflect
perceived risk asafunction ofmanyfactors, includingpoliticaland otherex-
propriationrisks).
273 Bhattacharya& Daouk, supra note19, at79.
274 Id. at78, 97, 202.
275 Bhattarchaya and Daouk concluded that the m ere existence of insider 
trading regulations does not affect the cost of equity, and that actual enforce-
ment m atters greatly, but they m ade no attem pt as finance professors to 
ascertain whethertherewereanyqualitativedifferencesin thelaw, andifso,
whethersuchdifferenceshadanyeffect. Id. at78.
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oflaw on thebooksmatterstoo. Wharton ProfessorLuziHailand
Chicago ProfessorChristian Leuz, forexam ple, have concluded
after an empirical study that countries legal institutions are 
significantly related to internationaldifferences in the costof
equity capital.276 They have found that firms in countries with 
more extensive disclosure requirem entsand strongersecurities
regulation ... displayalowercostofcapital, even aftertraditional
controls for firm and country risk.277
A. Increased Liquidity and Decreases in Cost of Equity Capital
Morespecifically, recentempiricalevidencesuggeststhatthe
adoption ofinsidertradinglawslikethoseintheEuropean Union
that require equality of access have a statistically significant 
correlation with econom ically significantincreases in liquidity
anddecreasesin thecostofequitycapital.278
Here, itisnotablethatin early2003, theEuropeanParliament
adopted theMarketAbuseDirective(M.A.D.)2003/6/EC, which
introduced a comprehensive framework to tackle insider dealing 
and market manipulation practices and, among other things, was 
aim ed specifically at increas[ing] investor confidence and m ar-
ketintegrity by prohibiting those who possess inside informa-
tion from trading in related financial instrum ents.279 ArticleII
oftheM.A.D. requiresm emberstatesto:
prohibit any person   who possesses inside inform ation [(a) 
byvirtueofhismembershipoftheadministrative, management
orsupervisorybodiesoftheissuer;or(b)byvirtueofhisholding
inthecapitaloftheissuer;or(c)byvirtueofhishavingaccess
totheinformation through theexerciseofhisemployment, pro-
fession or duties; or (d) by virtue of his criminal activities] from 
276 LuziHail& Christian Leuz, International Differences in the Cost of
Equity Capital: Do Legal Institutions and Securities Regulations Matter?, 44
J. ACCT. RES. 485, 524(2006).
277 Id.
278 Christensenetal., supra note266, at13, 35.
279 Explanatory Memorandum, Proposalfora Directive ofthe European
ParliamentandoftheCouncilon CriminalSanctionsforInsiderDealingand
Market Manipulation, Doc. 52011PC0654, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con
tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011PC0654&from=ENDoc. [https://perma.cc
/N7NZ-Q7L9].
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usingthatinformation byacquiringordisposingof, orbytrying
toacquireordisposeof, forhisown accountorfortheaccount
ofa third party, eitherdirectlyorindirectly, financialinstru-
mentstowhich thatinformationrelates[.]280
Article III ofthe M.A.D. addresses tipping, as it requires
mem berstatestoprohibitanyinsider, temporaryinsider, share-
holder or m isappropriator from (a) disclosing inside inform ation 
toanyotherperson unlesssuch disclosureism adeinthenormal
course ofthe exercise ofhis employment, profession orduties;
[or](b)recommendingorinducinganotherperson, on thebasisof
insideinformation, toacquireordisposeoffinancialinstruments
to which that inform ation relates.281 Critically(unlikeU.S. law,
which, underChiarella, Dirks, and Newman, onlyprohibitsout-
sidetradersfrom using insideinform ation whereitisaccom pa-
nied by a fiduciary breach ormisappropriation282), ArticleIV of
theM.A.D. alsoexpressly barsoutsidersfrom trading on mate-
rialnonpublicinformation regardless of how they received it, as
itrequires m emberstates to also ban trading by anyone who 
possessesinsideinformation whilethatperson knows, orought
to have known, that it is inside inform ation.283
Asimplementation oftheM.A.D. by European countrieshas
been staggered, Christensen, Hail, andLeuzwereabletoexploit
this tim ing differentialto em pirically study the effects ofits
im plem entation (and, separately, thatoftheE.U. Transparency
Directive) upon market liquidity and firms cost of equity capital 
across differentcountries while accounting for generalmarket
movements and other potentially confounding effects.284 They
concluded that market liquidity increases and firms cost of 
capitaldecreasesasthetwoE.U. directivesbecom eeffectivein
the m em ber states.285 Followingim plem entation oftheM.A.D.,
increased liquidity was evident under both ofthe established
liquidity proxiesofbid-ask spreadsand percentageofzero-return
280 CouncilDirective2003/6/EC, supra note21, art. II.
281 Id. art. III.
282 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647, 660, 665 (1983);United States v.
Newm an, 773 F.3d 438, 44950 (2d Cir. 2014). 
283 CouncilDirective2003/6/EC, supra note21, art. IV.
284 Christensenetal., supra note 266, at 12, 20. 
285 Id. at35.
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days(theproportion oftrading dayswith zerodailystock returns
outofallpotentialtradingdaysin agiven quarter).286 Likewise,
decreasesin the costofcapitalfollowing implementation ofthe
M.A.D. wereevidentfrom both thedividend yieldsand im plied
costofcapitalmodelscommonlyusedinthefinanceliterature.287
Thesepositivemarketeffectsareparticularlypronouncedwhere
countrieshaveanotherwisestronghistoryofpriorsecuritiesregu-
lation and exhibita true willingnessto implem entand enforce
such new regulations.288 And while the United States has a
lengthy history ofsecurities regulation as a first-m over in the
area,289 its politicalwillto effectively im plem ent and enforce
meaningfulchangestoinsidertradinglaw akin tothoseinEurope
remainstobeseen.
Given thebalanceofallegedbenefits(largelyspeculativeand
few)and harm s (to shareholders, issuers, em ployers, and the
capitalmarketsasa whole)thatareassociated with insidertrad-
ing, now isthetimeforlegislatorstodevelop such will. Moreover,
based on the foregoing arguments, theircampaign contributors
in thesecuritiesand financialservicesindustries290 should also
286 Id. at 3, 1718. 
287 Id. at22.
288 Id. at6.
289 See, e.g., Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 19, at88;McGee, supra
note28, at207 (recognizingthattheUnitedStateswasthefirstmajorcountryto
enactaninsidertradinglaw).
290 Contributionsby the financialand securitiesindustry have tended to
dominatethecampaign warchestsoftheleadership ofthetwokeyCongres-
sionalcommitteesresponsibleforfinancialserviceslegislation, andbeforewhom
insidertradingbillscurrently arepending:theHouse FinancialServicesCom-
mittee(chairedbyJebHensarling, andbeforewhichtheBanInsiderTradingAct
of2015 and theInsiderTradingProhibition Actarepending)and theSenate
Committeeon Banking, Housing & Urban Development(chaired by Richard
Shelby, andbeforewhich theStopIllegalInsiderTradingActispending). See
Rep. Jeb Hensarling, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/politi
cians/summary.php?cid=N00024922 [https://perma.cc/SQU4-6WM2] (listing
Rep. Jeb Hensarlings top five campaign committee contributors for 20132014, 
with JPMorganChase& Co. andGoldman Sachsas#1 and#2 respectively;and
top fiveindustriesfrom which campaign committeecontributorsweredrawn
in 20132014, with Securities & Investm ent at #3); see also Sen. Richard C
Shelby, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https:/www.opensecrets.org/politicians/summary.php
?cid=N00009920 [https://perma.cc/A2HM-T5LE](listing Sen. Richard Shelbys 
top five campaign com mittee contributors for 20092014, with BNY Mellon 
336 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:275
supportanew legislativeefforttobetterdefineandcurtailinsider
trading totheextentthey wish tomaintain a vibrant, effective,
andethicalcapitalmarket.
B. Greater Ease of Enforcement
Ifdesigned properly, according to the equalaccess theory,
such an insidertradinglaw would alsobeeasiertoenforcethan
currentlaw.291 AsPenn StateLaw ProfessorMarcoVentoruzzo
hasexplained, an approach basedon equalityofaccess, likethat
adopted in Europe under the M.A.D.,292 is broader and en-
forcementactions do notneed to jum p through the same legal
loopholestosuccessfullyargueaviolation ofinsidertradingpro-
hibitions.293 To establish liability, regulatorswould only need to
prove that the defendant traded on materialnonpublic infor-
mation concerning an issuerorfinancialinstrum entthatcould
not, in principle, have been available to others through inde-
pendentand otherwiselawfulduediligence.294 Thegovernm ent
and FMR (formerly Fidelity Managementand Research)as#2 and #3 respec-
tively and top five industries from which campaign committee contributors
were drawn in 20092014, with Securities & Investm ent at #1). 
291 Ventoruzzo, supra note20, at3 (explainingthattheEuropeanapproachis
a more simple, elegant, and effective regulation that is more straightforward 
and easily enforceable). 
292 Id. at 1920 (recognizing that the European approach under the M.A.D. 
is based on the equal access to inform ation, under which the tippee does 
notneed tohavereceived theinform ation from an insiderthathasbreached
a fiduciary duty). 
293 Id. at25.
294 The M.A.D. accomplishes this basic goalthrough a slightly different
statutory regim e that turns largely on the definition of inside inform ation 
and then, pursuant to Articles II, III, and IV, prohibits virtually all people
insiders, tem porary insiders, m isappropriators, and outsiders from  trading 
on such inform ation to the extent they know[ ] or ought to have known, that 
it is inside inform ation. Council Directive 2003/6/EC, supra note 21, art. II
IV. Article I of the M.A.D. defines inside inform ation as 
informationofaprecisenaturewhichhasnotbeen madepublic,
relating, directlyorindirectly, tooneormoreissuersoffinan-
cialinstrumentsortooneormorefinancialinstrumentsand
which, ifitwere made public, would be likely to have a sig-
nificanteffecton thepricesofthosefinancialinstrumentsor
onthepriceofrelatedderivativefinancialinstrum ents.
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would notneed toshow thatadefendant-tippeereceived insider
information through a breach ofa fiduciary duty for personal
benefit,295 orsatisfythenearlyimpossibletaskofshowingthata
remote tippee (like the hedge fund portfolio m anagersin New-
man)wasawareofanypersonalbenefitreceivedbythetipper.296
Tipperswould beliableundera straightforward aidingand abet-
tingtheory, provided theyknowinglyorrecklesslyprovided ma-
terialnonpublic information to a person who was reasonably
likelytotradeorfurthertiptheinformation toatraderwhodid,
in fact, trade.
IV. CURRENT U.S. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
ThisArticlehasendeavoredtoestablish thereasonswhyover-
turningorlimitingNewman undertheforthcomingSalman case
is insufficient to effectively police m arket m isconduct, and to
make the case for a statute that adopts the equality of access 
theory ofinsidertrading. ThisSection willbriefly exam ine the
currentlegislative proposalsthatare pending in Congressto re-
form U.S. insidertrading law. Todate, threesuch billsexist.297
Italsoprovidesthat
[i]n relation to derivatives on com m odities, inside inform a-
tion shall m ean inform ation of a precise nature which has not 
been made public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or
moresuchderivativesandwhichusersofmarketsonwhichsuch
derivativesare traded would expectto receive in accordance
withacceptedmarketpracticesonthosem arkets.
Finally, itprovidesthat
[f]orpersonscharged with theexecution ofordersconcerning
financial instrum ents, inside inform ation shall also m ean in-
formation conveyed by a client and related to the clients pending 
orders, which isofa precisenature, which relatesdirectlyor
indirectlytooneormoreissuersoffinancialinstrum entsorto
oneormorefinancialinstruments, andwhich, ifitweremade
public, wouldbelikelytohaveasignificanteffectonthepricesof
thosefinancialinstrumentsoron thepriceofrelated derivative
financialinstruments.
Id., art. I.
295 Ventoruzzo, supra note20, at19.
296 Id. at 1819; see UnitedStatesv. Newman, 773 F.3d438, 443 (2dCir. 2014).
297 Jonathan E. Richman, Tanya J. Dmitronow & Edward Canter, Third
Congressional Proposal to Define Insider Trading, NATL L. REV. (Mar. 27, 2015),
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Afteranalyzing each below, this Article shallargue that, with
minorm odification, theUnitedStatesshouldadoptS. 702.
A. The Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015
H.R. 1173, the Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015, was intro-
ducedin theHousebyMassachusettsRepresentativeStephen F.
Lynch on February27, 2015, andreferredtotheHouseComm it-
tee on FinancialServices, where itremainsatthe tim e ofthis
writing.298 Thebillwould amend section 10 ofthe1934Securities
ExchangeAct(15 U.S.C. §78j), m akingitunlawfulunderanew
subparagraph(d)(1):
Topurchaseorsellanysecurity, oranysecurities-basedswap
agreement, based on information thatthe person knows or,
consideringfactorsincludingfinancialsophistication, knowledge
ofandexperiencein financialmatters, position in acompany,
and amount ofassets under management, should know is
materialinformationandinsideinformation.299
Addressing Newman, in a newly proposed subsection (d)(2),
thebillpurportstorequirethatnothing in this subsection m ay 
be construed ... (B)to require for an action under paragraph
[d](1) a personal benefit to any party.300 Although the billex-
pressly declines to affect liability under existing Section 10(b),301
thisprovision would, bycreatinganew typeofSection (d)(2)vio-
lation, seeminglyoverturnDirkss holding that the prosecutor must 
show thatthe tipper received a personal benefit.302 Itwould
alsoaffectNewmansholding thattheprosecutormustshow that
thetippee-defendantknew (orconsciouslyavoidedknowing)that
theinsiderreceivedapersonalbenefitinexchangeforthetip.303
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/third-congressional-proposal-to-define-in
sider-trading[https://perma.cc/2HW9-9ZWU].
298 Ban InsiderTradingActof2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. (2015), https://
www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1173/text [https:/perma.cc/ER
P8-FXUS].
299 Id. §2(d)(1).
300 Id. §2(d)(2)(B).
301 Id. §2(d)(2)(A).
302 Id. §2(d)(2)(B);Dirksv. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983).
303 UnitedStatesv. Newman, 773 F.3d438, 442 (2dCir. 2014).
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However, innewlyproposedsection (d)(3)(A), thebillgoesonto
define inside information as inform ation that is (i) nonpublic 
and (ii) obtained ... (I) illegally; (II) directly or indirectly from  
an issuerwith an expectation ofconfidentiality orthatsuch in-
formation will only be used for a legitimate purpose, or (III) in 
violation of a fiduciary duty.304 Clearly, portionsofthebillthat
reference obtaining the inform ation illegally and from  an is-
suerwith an expectation ofconfidentiality are attempts to codify 
the misappropriation theory. Yetthe billcontinues to refer to
the violation of a fiduciary duty. It is therefore unclear whether 
the provision thatpurports to eliminate the personal benefit 
requirementwillhave the intended effect, unlessthe billisin-
tended toredefinewhatconstitutesa breach ofa fiduciaryduty
in a way thatoverridesthe Dirks majoritys decision requiring
an illm otiveofpersonalgain forabreachoffiduciaryduty.305
Additionally, thebillproposesamodificationtosection (e)of15
U.S.C. §78t, which wouldsubjecttoaidingandabettingliability
any person who 
intentionallydisclose[s]withoutalegitimatebusinesspurposeto
another person information thatthe discloser knows or, con-
sidering factorsincluding financialsophistication, knowledge
ofandexperiencein financialmatters, position in acompany,
and amount ofassets under management, should know is
materialinformationandinsideinformation....306
Whilethisprovision m aybean attempttoaddteeth toRegu-
lation FD (which generallyrequiresthatissuermaterialinforma-
tion bedisclosedsimultaneouslybutdoesnotcurrentlyconstitute
a securitiesfraud violation underRule 10b-5),307 itskey caveat
to liability that is, disclosures without a legitimate business
purpose remains undefined.308 Moreover, whileselectivedisclo-
sure for a personal benefit would presumably not be a legitimate 
business purpose, it is unclear whether selective disclosure to a 
304 H.R. 1173 §2(d)(3)(A).
305 Id.
306 Id. §2(e)(2).
307 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange ActRelease
Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51738 (Aug. 24, 2000).
308 H.R. 1173 §2(e)(2)(emphasisadded).
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large shareholderforpurposesofmanaging quarterly earnings
expectationsorpermitting front-running asa reward forshare-
holderbehaviorthatassiststhecom pany would bedeemed ille-
gitimate. Whilesuch disclosuresm aybebeneficialtoacom pany,
they may nonetheless harm persons not privy to the advance
information.
B. The Insider Trading Prohibition Act
H.R. 1625, the Insider Trading Prohibition Act, was intro-
duced in the House ofRepresentatives by ConnecticutRepre-
sentative Jam es Himes on March 25, 2015, and subsequently
referredtotheHouseCommitteeonFinancialServices.309 Itwould
addanew section 16A tothe1934SecuritiesExchangeAct.310
Section (a) of that new provision, entitled Prohibition Against 
Trading SecuritiesWhile In Possession OfMaterial, Nonpublic
Information, provides in pertinent part that 
[i]tshallbeunlawfulforany person, directly orindirectly, to
purchase, sell, orenterinto, causethepurchaseorsaleofor
entryinto, anysecurity... whilein possession ofmaterial, non-
publicinformationrelatingtosuch security... orrelatingtothe
marketforsuch security... ifsuch person knows, orrecklessly
disregards, thatsuchinformationhasbeenobtainedwrongfully,
orthatsuch purchase, sale, orentrywouldconstituteawrong-
fuluseofsuchinformation.311
Section (b) of that new provision, entitled Prohibition Against 
the WrongfulCom m unication ofCertain Material, Nonpublic
Inform ation, further provides that 
[i]tshallbe unlawfulforany person whose own purchase or
saleofasecurity... wouldviolatesubsection (a)(referredtoin
this subsection as the com m unicating person), wrongfully to 
communicatematerial, nonpublicinformation relatingtosuch
security ... to any other person if  
(1) the other person  
309 InsiderTradingProhibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. (2015), https://
www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1625/text [https://perma.cc/CD
8H-7AQF].
310 Id.
311 Id. §16A(a).
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(A)purchases, sells, orcausesthepurchaseorsaleof,
any security orsecurity-based swap orentersinto or
causesthe entry into any security-based swap agree-
ment, towhichsuchcomm unicationrelates;or
(B) communicates the information to another person
whomakesorcausessuch a purchase, sale, orentry
whileinpossessionofsuchinformation;and
(2)such apurchase, sale, orentrywhilein possession ofsuch
informationisreasonablyforeseeable.312
Each ofthese provisions turns on the m eaning ofthe word
wrongful. Proposed section 16A(a) prohibits trading if the 
traderknowsorrecklessly disregardsthatthe information has
been obtained wrongfully, or that such a trade would constitute 
a wrongful use of such inform ation.313 Proposed section 16A(b),
covering tipping by insidersorpeoplewhoreceivetipsfrom in-
siderslikeDirks, makes it unlawful for such persons wrongfully 
to com municate the tip.314 Accordingly, a newly proposed sec-
tion16A(c)explainsthatsuchtradingortipping
[i]swrongfulonlyiftheinformation hasbeen obtainedby, orits
communication or use would constitute, directly or indirectly  
(A) theft, bribery, misrepresentation, or espionage
(throughelectronicorotherm eans);
(B)aviolation ofanyFederallaw protectingcomputer
data or the intellectualproperty or privacy ofcom-
puterusers;or
(C)conversion, misappropriation, orotherunauthorized
and deceptivetakingofsuch information, ora breach
ofany fiduciary duty orany otherpersonalorother
relationshipoftrustandconfidence.315
In m yview, thisdefinition ofwrongful trading or tipping is 
narrow. Whileitwouldcodifymuch ofwhatiscoveredbythecur-
rentcaselaw (e.g., misappropriation), andseem inglybolsterthe
consequencesofcertain typesofselectivedisclosuresthatmight
currently bedeemed relatively minorRegulation FD violations,
thisdefinition would apparently excludeselectively disclosed tips
that are authorized by the issuer. The definition of wrongful 
312 Id. §16A(b).
313 Id. §16(A)(a).
314 Id. §16(A)(b).
315 Id. §16A(c)(1).
342 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:275
continues to adhere to the fiduciary duty standard, thus seem -
ingly excluding from prosecution trading ortipping information
thatdoesnotinvolvem isappropriation orabreach ofan existing
fiduciarydutyforpersonalbenefit, likethatin Dirks.316
Finally, section16A(c)(2)providesthat
[i]tshallnotbe necessary [forprosecution]thatthe person
trading whilein possession ofsuch information ... ormaking
the communication ... know the specificmeansby which the
information was obtained orcommunicated, orwhetherany
personalbenefitwaspaid orpromised by ortoany person in
thechain ofcommunication, solongastheperson tradingwhile
in possession ofsuch information ormaking the communica-
tion ... wasaware, orrecklesslydisregarded thatsuch informa-
tionwaswrongfullyobtainedorcommunicated.317
This provision apparently intended to lower the knowledge 
threshold that the Second Circuit announced in Newman
would go a long way toward ensuring that rem ote but savvy
tippees, likethedefendantsin thatcase, couldonceagain realis-
tically be prosecuted. Itwould remove the Newman courts re-
quirem entthattippeesbeaware that any personal benefit was 
paid.318 However, as the provision fails to define personal ben-
efit, it would seem ingly not address what constitutes a personal 
benefit.319 Nor would itaddress the fundam entalrequirem ent
announced in Dirks thatthe prosecutorprove that, in fact, the
tipperreceivedapersonalbenefit.320 Accordingly, asthedissent-
ingJusticesin Dirks explained, tipsand subsequenttradesthat
harm non-privy shareholderswould presumably continue to be
lawfulifH.R. 1625 wereadopted, solongastheydonotinvolve
thereceiptofapersonalbenefitbythetipper.
C. The Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act
Toalargeextent, thestatutoryregimeforwhich thisArticle
has argued could be effectuated by adopting S. 702, the Stop 
Illegal Insider Act, which was introduced by Senator Jack Reed 
316 Dirksv. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983).
317 H.R. 1625 §16(A)(c)(2).
318 Id.;see UnitedStatesv. Newman, 773 F.3d438, 450 (2dCir. 2014).
319 H.R. 1625 §16(A)(c)(2).
320 Dirks, 463 U.S. at662.
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ofRhode Island and SenatorBob Menendez ofNew Jersey on
March 11, 2015.321 Atthetim eofwriting, thisbillispendingin
theSenateCommitteeonBanking, Housing, andUrban Affairs.322
This concisely written billwould add a new subsection (d)(1)to
section10 ofthe1934SecuritiesExchangeAct, makingitunlawful
(d)(1)(A)[t]o purchase, sell, orcause the purchase orsale of
any security on the basis ofmaterialinformation that the
personknowsorhasreasontoknow isnotpubliclyavailable.
(B)To knowingly orrecklessly communicate materialinforma-
tion thattheperson knowsorhasreason toknow isnotpub-
liclyavailabletoanyotherpersonundercircumstancesinwhich
itisforeseeablethatsuch communication islikelytoresultin
aviolationofsubparagraph(A).323
In supportofthebill, SenatorReedissuedastatementroundly
condemning the Second Circuits Newman opinion, which he
argued defies com m on sense.324 Implicitly also criticizing the
Dirks opinion and siding with the dissenting Justices in that
case, SenatorReed argued that[i]t should not matter whether 
someone, whotraded on materialinform ation thatwasnotpub-
licly available, knew whether the source ofsuch information
breached a fiduciary duty and additionally received a personal
benefit in return for sharing this inside inform ation.325 Accord-
ingly, SenatorReedexplainedhisbillasfollows:
Simplyput, ifaperson tradesasecurityonthebasisofmaterial
information thatthe person knowsorhasreason to know is
notpublicly available, then they have engaged in unlawful
insidertrading. Underourlegislation, itisirrelevantwhether
the trader knew of the sources fiduciary duty or whether the 
sourcederivedanypersonalbenefit. Whatmattersiswhether
thetraderknew orhasreason toknow thatsuch traderhad
an unfairadvantagein beinggiven materialinformation that
wasnotsharedwith thebroaderpublic.326
321 S. Res. 702, 114thCong. (2015).
322 Id.
323 Id. § 2(d)(1)(A)(B). 
324 161 CONG. REC. 41, S1440-S1441 (dailyed. Mar. 11, 2014)(statementof
Sen. Reed), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2015/03/11/senate
-section/article/S1440-1 [https://perma.cc/676T-RLWB].
325 Id.
326 Id.
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Thebillfurtherprovidesin proposed section (D)(2)that, for
purposes of the new subsection, the term not publicly available 
shallnotincludeinform ation thattheperson hasindependently
developed from publicly available sources.327 AccordingtoSenator
Reed, thisprovision isintended to ensure that those who take 
the tim e to independently develop their own inform ation from
publicly available sources can trade on this independently de-
veloped information so thatpublicly available inform ation can
beanalyzedandinterpretedwithout fear of liability.328
Consistent with the equal access theory for which this Article 
hasargued, S. 702 would im proveexistingU. S. insidertrading
law by betteraligning itwith thefundamentalrequirementsof
publicmorality, eliminatingthefiduciarydutyrequirementsthat
currently allow certain formsofharmfulm arketcheating togo
unpunished, andlikelyimprovingcapitalmarketconditions.329 To
thoseends, SenatorReedexplained:
In short, bymakingitan offenseforthosewhocontributetoa
securities marketrigged in favor ofthe wellconnected, our
legislation focuseson providingeverydayinvestorswith afair
shotatseeingsomereturnsafterinvestingtheirhard-earned
savings. Incidentsofinsidertrading, and the perceived perva-
sivenessofthepractice, haveforyearsserved tovalidatethe
publics worst assumptions about Wall Street culture. It is time 
weclearlydefinewhatisappropriateunderthelaw and take
thismeaningfulstep towardsimproving the integrity ofour
securities m arkets for professionaltraders and amateur in-
vestorsalike.330
Moreover, byvirtueofsubsection (D)(2)above, which clearly
eschewsutopian parity-of-information idealsin lieu ofmoreviable
equalityofaccessrequirements, S. 702 wouldaccomplishtheseends
whilealsoproviding incentivestoindependently and lawfully de-
velopinformation.331
WhilethebillauthorizestheSEC toprovidecertainexemptions
toliability,332 I wouldsimplyclarify(d)(1)(A)abovebyindicating
327 See S. Res. 702, 114th Cong. §2(d)(2)(2015).
328 See 161 CONG. REC. 41, S1440S1441. 
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 See S. Res. 702, 114th Cong. §2(d)(1)(B)(3)(2015).
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thatsuch materialinformation does not include general m arket 
information (e.g., the University of Michigan Consumer Senti-
m entIndex), from which data can beindependentlygathered in
lieu ofpurchase, butrathercoversonlyspecificinformation con-
cerningan issuerortheirfinancialproducts. I wouldalsoextend
itsprohibition on insidertradingnotonly tosecurities, butalso
tootherfinancialinstrumentsastheEuropeanshavedoneunder
theM.A.D.333
CONCLUSION
ThisArticlehasendeavoredtomakethecaseforanew statu-
toryprovision in theUnited Statesthatwilldefineinsidertrad-
ing under an equality of access theory. It has supported this 
claim by highlighting them oraland legalgapsin existing U.S.
law. Insteadofcontinuingtodefineunlawfultradingsolelywith
referencetofiduciarybreach orm isappropriation, tradingon the
basisofm aterialnonpublicinformation mustbeunderstoodasa
fundam entally unfairform ofmarketcheating thatundermines
the equality ofopportunity required by the socialcontract, vio-
latesdeontologicalduties, anddemonstrablyproducesmoresocie-
talharm than good toinvestors, issuers, employers, and capital
marketsasawhole.
Now isthetimetoadoptanew statutoryprovisionthatfinally
defines insider trading. As Senate Bill S.702 purports to do, a 
newlyenactedstatuteshouldprohibittheuse, byanyone, ofma-
terialinformation concerningafinancialinstrumentthatisnot,
at least in principle, available to others through independent
andotherwiselawfuldiligence.
333 See CouncilDirective2003/6/EC, supra note21.

